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The William B. Lockhart Lecture*
Shall We Dance?
Steps for Legislators and Judges
in Statutory Interpretation
Shirley S. Abrahamson**
Robert L. Hughes***
In Margaret Landon's novel Anna and the King of Siam,'
the King hires Anna, a young English widow, to teach the
* This Essay is an expanded and annotated version of the William B.
Lockhart Lecture Justice Abrahamson delivered at the University of Minne-
sota Law School on March 29, 1990. The Lockhart Lecture Series honors for-
mer University of Minnesota Law School Dean William B. Lockhart.
** Justice, Wisconsin Supreme Court.
* Skadden Arps Fellow, Advocates for Children of New York, New
York City, N.Y. Robert L. Hughes was Justice Abrahamson's law clerk from
August 1, 1989, to July 31, 1990.
In preparation for the lecture and publication, the authors communicated
by telephone and mail with numerous state officials, including attorneys gen-
eral, legislators, legislative staff, and judges, seeking information about formal
and informal mechanisms for discourse between the judicial and legislative
branches about statutes. This Essay does not attempt to present an exhaus-
tive survey of legislative-judicial relations and legislative oversight mecha-
nisms in the 50 states. We attempt only to highlight states' experiences. State
officials were very generous in their responses. Sometimes one person charac-
terized the roles of his or her office or another state office differently from
another person. We have tried to characterize the states as we understood the
responses to our questions. If there are errors in our interpretation of a state's
practice, they should be attributed to the authors, not to our correspondents.
Michael J. Remington, Counsel, House Committee on the Judiciary Subcom-
mittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice, and Rob-
ert A. Katzmann, President, the Governance Institute and Visiting Fellow,
The Brookings Institution, were kind enough to read an earlier version of this
text and offer suggestions. We want to thank all our correspondents, too nu-
merous to name, for their assistance. Special thanks to Wisconsin State Sena-
tors Thomas M. Barrett, Brian B. Burke, and Fred Risser, who have served on
the Wisconsin Law Revision Committee, and Attorney Janice Baldwin, Senior
Staff Attorney of the Wisconsin Legislative Council, who staffs the Commit-
tee, for discussing the workings of the Wisconsin Law Revision Committee
with us and giving us their insights. Diana Cook did her usual masterful job in
preparing this manuscript for publication.
1. M. LANDON, ANNA AND THE KING OF SIAM (1944).
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many royal children of his many royal wives. Rodgers and
Hammerstein successfully recast the story of the clash of the
diverse cultures of Anna and the autocratic King into the musi-
cal The King and I. In the musical version, after a gala recep-
tion and while absorbed in the strange Occidental custom of a
man dancing with his arm around a woman's waist, the King
persuades Anna to teach him the English dance that accompa-
nies her song "Shall We Dance?" 2 The scene and the song sug-
gest that, despite their conspicuous differences, the two have
enough in common to learn from each other and work together
with a single purpose.
We propose to examine the relations between two different
partners - the judiciary and the legislature - and attempts to
increase cooperation between these two cultures in the statu-
tory world in which we live. Statutes are now the predominant
music to the ears of law professionals; resolution of many, if
not most, cases today involves statutes.3 Yet the working rela-
tionship between the legislature and the judiciary in efforts
with respect to statutes hardly compares with two dancers'
graceful movements to the lyrical notes of Broadway.
Commentators have long recognized that each branch
stands, in Judge Cardozo's words, in "proud and silent isola-
2. Shall We Dance?
We've just been introduced
I do not know you well
But when the music started
Something drew me to your side.
So many men and girls are in each other's arms
It made me think we might be
Similarly occupied.
Shall we dance?
On a bright cloud of music shall we fly?
Shall we dance?
Shall we then say "good night" and mean "goodbye"?
Or perchance,
When the last little star has left the sky,
Shall we still be together
With our arms around each other
And shall you be my new romance?
On the clear understanding
That this kind of thing can happen
Shall we dance?
Shall we dance? Shall we dance?
R. RODGERS & 0. HAMMERSTEIN, THE KING & I, act II, scene IV, at 120-21
(1951).
3. Mikva, A Reply to Judge Starr's Observations, 1987 DUKE L.J. 380, 380;
Traynor, Statutes Revolving in Common-Law Orbits, 17 CATH. U.L. REV. 401,
402 (1968).
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tion" from the other.4 Judge Abner Mikva has written that the
problem with drafting statutes and with statutory construction
"as often as not is the unawareness that the legislative branch
and the judicial branch have of each other's game rules."5
Hence, in spite of the shared responsibility for the quality of
statutes, the judiciary and the legislature rarely move together
with a sense of common purpose. Judges and legislators have
different institutional concerns regarding statutes, resulting in
a working relationship that could be described as atonal, if not
dissonant.
4. Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARV. L. REv. 113, 125 (1921).
Judge Frank Coffin has described the courts and the legislature as standing
aloof from one another. Coffin, The Federal Number 86: On Relations Be-
tween the Judiciary and Congress, in JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS: TOWARD IN-
STITUTIONAL CoMnTy 21, 25 (R. Katzmann ed. 1988) [hereinafter JUDGES AND
LEGISLATORS].
5. Mikva, Reading and Writing Statutes, 28 S. Tax. L.J. 181, 183 (1986);
see also MIikva, supra note 3, at 384-85 (suggesting that Congress and judges
should agree on canons of interpretation). The National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws adopted a Model Statutory Construction
Act that was enacted in three states. 14 U.L.A. 387 (1990). The Federal Courts
Study Committee, an advisory committee established by Congress to study re-
form of the federal courts, suggested in its Report dated April 2, 1990, that
Congress should consider a "checklist" for legislative staff to use in reviewing
proposed legislation for technical problems to avoid statutory interpretation
problems. A checklist could be used by drafters to remind them to include the
following items in their review of legislation, items the court must frequently
furnish in litigation about statutes:
- the appropriate statute of limitation;
- whether a private cause of action is contemplated;
- whether pre-emption of state law is intended;
- the definition of key terms;
- the mens rea requirement in criminal statutes;
- severability;
- whether a proposed bill would repeal or otherwise circumscribe,
displace, impair, or change the meaning of existing federal
legislation;
- whether state courts are to have jurisdiction and, if so, whether
an action would be removable to federal court;
- the types of relief available;
- whether retroactive applicability is intended;
- the conditions for any award of attorney's fees authorized;
- whether exhaustion of administrative remedies is a prerequisite
to any civil action authorized;
- the conditions and procedures relating to personal jurisdiction
over persons incurring obligations under the proposed legislation;
- the viability of private arbitration and other dispute resolution
agreements under enforcement and relief provisions; and
- whether any administrative proceedings provided for are to be
formal or informal.
REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURT STUDY CO1MITTE 91 (Apr. 2,1990) [hereinaf-
ter FEDERAL COURT REPORT].
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Increasingly, calls are heard for better understanding be-
tween judges and legislators, for judges and legislators to learn
about each other's institutional cultures to improve the quality
of statutes for the public good.6 Many recent calls for improve-
ment in institutional structures affecting legislative-judicial re-
lations have their genesis in Judge Cardozo's proposal in 1921 to
create a "Ministry of Justice" to mediate between the two
branches of government. Composed of members of the judici-
ary, the legislature, law schools, and the bar, the Ministry
would study the law and recommend changes. "The spaces be-
tween the planets," wrote Cardozo, "will at last be bridged."
7
At the federal level, recent calls for mediating or facilitat-
ing institutions to improve the quality of statutes have been
more modest in scope than the Cardozoan model. Drawing on
the work of Judge Henry Friendly,8 Judge Ruth Bader Gins-
burg and others have suggested that Congress establish a legis-
lative statutory revision committee composed of members of
the House and Senate as well as retired members of the judici-
ary to take a second look at statutes to remedy ambiguities and
imperfections that the courts and legal critics uncover. The
6. Justice Abrahamson participated in a Workshop on Problems of Com-
munication Between the Judicial and Legislative Branches sponsored by The
Governance Institute, May 16, 1989, in Washington, D.C.; see JUDGES AND LEG-
IsLAToRs, supra note 4 (a collection of essays that discuss the institutional
comity that should exist between judges and legislators); Panel 1 I- Congress
and the Judiciary: An Inquiry into Problems of Statutory Construction and
Revision, in Proceedings of the Forty-ninth Judicial Conference of the District
of Columbia (May 22-24, 1988), reprinted in 124 F.R.D. 241, 312-35 (1989)
(panel discussion included, inter alia, a Congressman, a Federal Circuit Judge,
and the General Counsel of the U.S. House of Representatives); H. Solomon,
Legislative-Judicial Relations: Seeking a New Partnership: Phase I Final Re-
port and Agenda for Future Action (National Center for State Courts, 1989);
Ridge & Friesen, Legislative-Judicial Relations: Seeking a New Partnership,
Conference Report, 14 ST. CT. J. 19 (1990); National Center for State Courts,
Conference Summary Report, Legislative-Judicial Relations: Seeking a New
Partnership (Oct. 1-3, 1989) (Denver Conference) [hereinafter Conference
Summary]; Blue, Legislators & Judges: Mending the Rift, ST. LEGISLATURES
34 (Mar. 1991).
7. Cardozo, supra note 4, at 125; see also Pound, Anachronisms in the
Law, 3 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y 142, 146 (1920) [hereinafter Pound, Anachro-
nisms] (proposing a ministry of justice); Pound, A Ministry of Justice: A New
Role for the Law School, 38 A.B.A. J. 637 (1952) [hereinafter Pound, Ministry]
(proposing that law school faculties serve as a ministry of justice). The minis-
try of justice was to be a continuing body harmonizing the common law and
legislation. States adopted the concept, changing Pound's ministry of justice to
law revision commissions.
8. Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking - Judges Wlho Can't and Legisla-
tors Who Won't, 63 CoLUM. L. REv. 787 (1963).
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committee would "hear and initiate action on pleas for a clear
statement of what Congress meant or in any event what it
means now."s In Judge Ginsburg's view, federal statutes in
need of repair involve "issues that have little or no political sig-
nificance in the partisan sense," thus making congressional ac-
tion a routine endeavor.10 Judge Ginsburg concludes that "a
second view," set in motion by judicial decisions, could advance
the coherence of federal law more effectively than a new set of
courts."
9. Ginsburg & Huber, The Intercircuit Committee, 100 HARv. L. REv.
1417, 1433 (1987).
10. Ginsburg, A Plea for Legislative Review, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 995, 1013
(1987) (citing Justice Stevens). These calls for a federal legislative oversight
mechanism are generally proposed for noncontroversial areas involving "the
petty tinkering of the legal system which is necessary to keep it in running
order." Pound, Anachronisms, supra note 7, at 145. Ginsburg and Huber di-
rect their ameliorative efforts to "[s]tatutory prescriptions in need of repair...
[with] little or no political significance in the partisan sense. A new standing
committee could serve as a gap filler; its business would be to examine court
decisions construing federal statutes and to draft bills to resolve actual or po-
tential conflicts." Ginsburg & Huber, supra note 9, at 1431-32 (citations omit-
ted).
For a description of the ambiguities, glitches, gaps, and serious problems
in statutes Congress might reexamine, see F. Coffin, Remarks at the Proceed-
ings of the Forty-ninth Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit
(May 22-24, 1988), reprinted in 124 F.R.D. 241, 318-21 (1989).
11. Ginsburg, supra note 10, at 1017. Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg and
others suggest a legislative solution rather than a judicial solution to the prob-
lem of conflicting judicial interpretations of federal statutes by federal courts
of appeal. In response to the suggestion that Congress create another level of
federal courts to resolve such conflicts, they contend Congress itself can re-
solve the conflict. See Ginsburg & Huber, supr note 9, at 1433 (citations omit-
ted). For other judges making similar proposals, see Ginsburg & Huber, supra
note 9, at 1431 (Justice Stevens); Ginsburg, supra note 10, at 1016 n.142 (Jus-
tice Douglas); Stevens, Some Thoughts on Judicial Restraint, 66 JUDICATURE
177, 183 (1982); Feinberg, Foreword - A National Court of Appeals?, 42
BROOKLYN L. REv. 611, 627 (1975); Handler, What To Do with the Supreme
Court's Burgeoning Calendars?, 5 CARDozo L. REv. 249, 275-76 (1984).
The mechanisms for exchange of information between the courts and leg-
islatures on questions of statutory interpretation include "a second look at
laws" Committee of Congress; a group of law professors to perform the same
function as such a committee; a National Law Foundation, an informal group
in the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts at the Federal Judicial Center
to direct problems to the proper source for correction; and an entity to collate
and distribute suggestions by judges to the Speaker of the House and Presi-
dent of the Senate for referral to appropriate congressional committees. See F.
Coffin, supra note 10; see also R. Katzmann, Remarks at the Proceedings of
the Forty-ninth Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit (May
22-24, 1988), reprinted in 124 F.R.D. 322, 325-26 (1989) (proposing low visibility
mechanism to facilitate communication between legislature and judiciary);
Coffin, Grace Under Pressure: A Call for Judicial Self-Help, 50 OHio ST. L.J.
399, 403 (1989) (advocating judges reporting statutory problems to legislative
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Our goal in this Essay is to step back from the debate at
the federal level and explore how state judges and state legisla-
tors appear to influence each other in the common enterprise
of interpreting, applying, and improving statutes. True to their
Brandeisian role in the federal system,' 2 the states offer a
wealth of material about the interaction between the two
branches of government. We shall address three questions:
How do state judges interact with legislators to improve stat-
utes through their published opinions? What mechanisms has
the legislature created to respond to judicial opinions and to fa-
cilitate discourse between the two branches regarding the im-
pact and quality of statutes? Is there a role judges should play
in the legislative process beyond their published opinions to im-
prove the legislative product? Judges and legislators might ask
one another, Shall we dance? On a bright cloud of statutes
shall we fly?13
I. JUDGES' INTERACTION WITH LEGISLATORS IN
PUBLISHED OPINIONS
The resolution of disputes through judicial interpretation
of statutes is the step in legislative-judicial relations that
judges, lawyers, law faculty, and law students know best. In
decisionmakers); Oakes, Judges on Judging: Grace Notes on 'Grace Under
Pressure,' 50 OHIo ST. L.J. 701, 714-15 (1989) (judges should report statutory
problems to legislators); Weis, The Federal Courts Study Committee Begins Its
Work, 21 ST. MARY'S L.J. 15, 20-21 (1989) (calling for exchange of information
between courts and Congress about ambiguities and deficiencies in legislative
drafting).
Former Congressman Robert Kastenmeier, Judge Judith N. Keep, Presi-
dent Rex Lee, Congressman Carlos J. Moorhead, and Judge Richard A. Pos-
ner have all called for institutional reforms in both the legislative and judicial
branches to enable the judiciary and Congress to interact intelligently. They
concluded that, at the very least, the Federal Courts Study Committee should
have recommended that an entity be created within the Congress
modeled on the Office of Technology Assessment to serve three dis-
tinct functions [including] ... to call to the attention of the Congress
decisions by the courts and the executive branch that have important
consequences on the courts or the Congress; and.., to facilitate com-
munications between the branches by providing a contact point for
judges and other officials.
FEDERAL CouRT REPORT, supra note 5, at 92-93.
12. "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try
novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the coun-
try." New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
13. See supra note 2 ("Shall we dance? On a bright cloud of music shall
we fly?").
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the last few years, academic interest in statutory interpretation
has resurged.14 The recent literature builds on theories of stat-
utory interpretation enunciated in the first half of this cen-
tury,15 reflects the debates of the 1970s and 1980s on federal
constitutional interpretation (culminating in the Bork hear-
ings), and embodies law and economics, institutional process
and public choice theory, and republicanism. 16
14. Perhaps the seminal works in the modern resurgence in interest in
the interpretation of statutes are J. HURST, DEALING WITH STATUTES (1982); G.
CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982), and G. GIL-
MORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW (1977).
15. See Chaffee, The Disorderly Conduct of Words, 41 COLUM. L. REv. 381
(1941); Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35
COLUm. L. REv. 809 (1935); Cox, Judge Learned Hand and the Interpretation
of Statutes, 60 HARv. L. REV. 370 (1947); Curtis, A Better Theory of Legal Inter-
pretation, 3 VAND. L. REV. 407 (1950); DeSloovere, The Equity and Reason of a
Statute, 21 CORNELL L.Q. 591 (1936); Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the
Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527 (1947); Holmes, The Theory of
Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417 (1899); Holmes, Law in Science and
Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. REV. 443 (1899); Horack, The Disintegration of
Statutory Construction, 24 IND. L.J. 335 (1949); Horack, Cooperative Action for
Improved Statutory Interpretation, 3 VAND. L. REV. 382 (1950); Landis, Statu-
tory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863 (1930); Llewellyn, A Realistic Juris-
prudence: The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REv. 431 (1930); Llewellyn, Remarks
on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules of Canons about How Stat-
utes Are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950); Phelps, Factors Influenc-
ing Judges in Interpreting Statutes, 3 VAND. L. REV. 456 (1950); Pound,
Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARv. L. REv. 383 (1908); Radin, A Short
Way with Statutes, 56 HARV. L. REV. 388 (1942).
16. For a history of statutory analysis, see Blatt, The History of Statutory
Interpretation A Study in Form and Substance, 6 CARDOzO L. REV. 799
(1985). For recent scholarship, see R. DICKERSON, INTERPRETATION AND AP-
PLICATION OF STATUTES (1975); W. ESKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY(1987); R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM ch. 9 (1985);
Abraham, Statutory Interpretation and Literary Theory: Some Common Con-
cerns of an Unlikely Pair, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 676 (1979); Abraham, Three
Fallacies of Interpretation. A Comment on Precedent and Judicial Decision,
23 ARIZ. L. REV. 771 (1981); Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87
MICH. L. REv. 20 (1988); Cohen, Legisprudence: Problems and Agenda, 11
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1163 (1983); Dickerson, Statutes and Constitutions in an Age
of Common Law, 48 U. Prrr. L. REv. 773 (1987); Easterbrook, Stability and Re-
liability in Judicial Decisions, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 422 (1988); Edwards, The
Role of a Judge in Modern Society: Some Reflections on Current Practice in
Federal Appellate Adjudication, 32 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 385 (1984); Epstein, The
Pitfalls of Interpretation, 7 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 101 (1984); Eskridge, Dy-
namic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987); Eskridge,
Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEo. L.J. 1361 (1988); Eskridge, Public
Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1007 (1989); Eskridge &
Frickey, Legislation Scholarship and Pedagogy in the Post-Legal Process Era,
48 U. PITT. L. REv. 691, 701-25 (1987); Eskridge & Frickey, Statutory Interpre-
tation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990); Farber, Legal Prag-
1991] 1051
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
The new scholarship usually examines federal statutes,
opinions of the United States Supreme Court, and theories of
statutory interpretation (especially the use of legislative his-
tory) that Supreme Court Justices espouse.17 Scholars postu-
matism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REv. 1331 (1988); Farber, Statutory
Interpretation, Legislative Inaction, and Civil Rights, 87 MICH. L. REv. 1
(1988); Farber & Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEx. L. REV.
873 (1987); Farber & Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L.
REV. 423 (1988); Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in
the Administrative State, 89 COLuM. L. REV. 452 (1989); Henschen, Statutory
Interpretations of the Supreme Court, 11 AM. POL. Q. 441 (1983); Hetzel,
Instilling Legislative Interpretation Skills in the Classroom and the Court-
room, 48 U. PITT. L. REv. 663 (1987); Kernochan, Statutory Interpretation: An
Outline of Method, 333 DALHousIE L.J. 6 (1972); Lane, Legislative Process and
Its Judicial Renderings: A Study in Contrast, 48 U. PITT. L. REv. 639 (1987);
Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation through Statutory Interpreta-
tion: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 223 (1986); Maltz, Statutory
Interpretation and Legislative Power: The Case for a Modified Intentionalist
Approach, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1988); Marshall, "Let Congress Do It" The Case
for an Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REV. 177 (1989);
Moglen & Pierce, Sunstein's New Canons: Choosing the Fictions of Statutory
Interpretation, 57 U. Cm. L. REV. 1203 (1990); Moore, The Semantics of Judg-
ing, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 151 (1981); Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpreta-
tion, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 277 (1985); Pierce, Introduction, Symposium" The
Legislative Process, 11 HoFSTRA L. REv. 1119 (1983); Popkin, The Collaborative
Model of Statutory Interpretation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 541 (1988); Posner, Statu-
tory Interpretation - in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L.
REV. 800 (1983); Posner, Legislation and Its Interpretation: A Primer, 68 NEB.
L. REV. 431 (1989); Rogers, Judicial Reinterpretation of Statutes: The Example
of Baseball and the Antitrust Laws, 14 Hous. L. REV. 611 (1977); Rubin, Law
and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 369 (1989);
Schwartz, Justice, Expediency, and Beauty, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 141 (1987);
Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest A Study of the Legislative
Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1
(1990); Sneed, The Art of Statutory Interpretation, 62 TEX. L. REV. 665 (1983);
Strauss, Legislative Theory and the Rule of Law: Some Comments on Rubin,
89 COLUM. L. REV. 427 (1989); Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regula-
tory State, 103 HARv. L. REV. 405 (1989); Sunstein, Principles, Not Fictions, 57
U. Cm. L. REV. 1247 (1990); Thomas, Statutory Construction Where Legisla-
tion Is Viewed as a Legal Institution, 3 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 191 (1966); Wil-
liams, Statutory Construction in Connecticut An Overview and Analysis, 62
CONN. B.J. 307 (1988); Note, Inten4 Clear Statements, and the Common Law:
Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court, 95 HARv. L. REv. 892 (1982).
17. Much energy has been devoted to the exploration of the use of federal
legislative history. See, e.g., OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, USING AND MISUSING LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY: A RE-EVALUATION OF T.HE STATUS OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1989); Dickerson, Statutory Interpretation:L Dip-
ping into Legislative History, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1125 (1983); Mikva, supra
note 3, at 380; Mikva, supra note 5, at 181; Starr, Observations about the Use of
Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L.J. 371, 375.
The need for and the use of available legislative history has also been ex-
tensively discussed at the state level. See, e.g., Allison & Hambleton, Research
1052 [Vol. 75:1045
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late the factors influencing Supreme Court decisions and
expound on the factors that should influence decisions. Acade-
micians explore anew, with beneficial results, the old war-hor-
ses of interpretation: textualism, literalism, plain meaning,
original intent, purpose, contextualism, canons of construction,
pre- and post-enactment legislative history, imaginative recon-
struction, counter-majoritarianism, statutory stare decisis, and
dynamic interpretation.
This emerging scholarship is important reading for judges
and lawyers, who too often merely intone the canons of con-
struction and resort to manipulable, mechanical rules in statu-
tory interpretation.18 Interpreting ambiguous statutes is not
easy. Judges and lawyers must strive for better interpretive
skills and thoughtful analysis.
The emphasis and scope of the new academic research,
however, concern us. To a large extent, academic analyses and
debate continue to focus on the judge's interpretation of the
text of the legislative enactment to resolve a particular case.19
Enormous energy is spent studying courts and judicial opinions
in Texas Legislative History, 1984 TEX. B.J. 314 (1984); Divilbiss, The Need for
Comprehensive Legislative History in Missouri, 36 J. Mo. B. 520 (1980);
Rhodes & Seereiter, The Search for Intent Aids to Statutory Construction in
lorida - An Update, 13 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 485 (1985); Smith, Legislative In-
tent. In Search of the Holy Grail, 53 CAL. ST. B.J. 294 (1978); Wang, Legisla-
tive History in Washington, 7 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 571 (1984); Wendt,
Researching Illinois Legislative Histories - A Practical Guide, 1982 S. ILL.
U.L.J. 601 (1982); White, Sources of Legislative Intent in California, 3 PAC.
L.J. 63 (1972); Comment, Statutory Interpretation - The Need for Improved
Legislative Records in Missouri, 38 Mo. L. REV. 84 (1973); Comment, Evaluat-
ing Oregon Legislative History: Tailoring an Approach to the Legislative Pro-
cess, 61 OR. L. REv. 421 (1982); Comment, The Use of Extrinsic Aids in
Determining Legislative Intent in California: The Need for Standardized Cri-
teria, 12 PAC. L.J. 189 (1980); WISCONSIN LEGISLATrvE REFERENCE BUREAU, AN
INTRODUCTION TO LEGISLATIVE HISTORY RESEARCH IN WISCONSIN (Brief 90-6,
June 1990). Legislative history is generally less available for the state legisla-
tures than for Congress. In Wisconsin, a resolution directing the legislative
reference bureau and the legislative council to study the feasibility and advisa-
bility of creating a public records center for legislative records did not pass. S.
J. Res. 46, 1989-90 Leg.
18. Llewellyn, supra note 15, at 401-06. For a humorous treatment of ju-
dicial canons of construction and interpretation of a statute, see Buchmeyer,
Judicial Logic: Birds and Ponies, 46 TEx. B.J. 1345 (1982).
19. Commentators have noted that statutory analysis continues to be
taught in the law schools with primary emphasis on the case law - the judi-
cial perspective of the legislative process. For a critique of this scholarship and
approach, see, e.g., Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 16, at 700-01; Hetzel, supra
note 16; Posner, supra note 16, at 801-05; Williams, Statutory Law in Legal Ed-
ucation " Still Second Class After All These Years, 35 MERCER L. REV. 803, 813-
19 (1984). For a discussion of the state legislature as an institution, see Rosen-
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as if the essence of the legal system is what courts do. Legal
scholars usually ask how the judge should interpret the text or
what the judge's role is when the statutory language is vague -
deliberately or unintentionally - or the statute is antiquated.
The continuing emphasis on cases and judicial analysis ignores
broader, and perhaps more fundamental, issues that reach be-
yond the confines of a particular case or code section. Com-
mentators in legal publications give little scholarly attention to
the legislature or the legislative process, except for legislative
history, or the legislative products, the statutes themselves.
In contrast to the academic focus on judicial interpretation
of statutes, much statutory interpretation takes place outside
the courtroom. Statutory interpretation takes place in the at-
torney's office in advising clients, in administrative agencies in
enforcing statutes, and in business offices in making business
decisions. In each of these nonjudicial forums, statutes are reg-
ularly construed by readers other than judges. In these forums,
statutes obtain their transformative power as they interact with
social, cultural, and economic problems. Courts must be prop-
erly understood, then, not as isolated bodies interpreting and
applying statutes in the particular disputes before them, but
acting instead within "a continuum of institutional processes
... often interacting in subtle and perhaps not always conscious
ways to influence the behavior of other processes. '20
Recognition that judges operate in a complex world ex-
tending beyond the confines of the courtroom may change some
of the questions about judicial opinions. Instead of concentrat-
ing on the judicial doctrines of statutory interpretation, com-
mentators may ask whether or how the court's interpretation
of the statute should stimulate or create the need for further
legislative action and whether the court's interpretation sug-
gests new avenues for legislative change. In this broader insti-
tutional context, a court has an interest in both the quality of
its interpretations and the quality of statutes in general. A
court's opinion interpreting a statute may affect the legislative
process and energize a legislative response.
For example, when the California Supreme Court con-
strued a state statute to allow municipalities to regulate the use
of pesticides, forces mobilized and the legislature overturned
thal, The State of State Legislatures: An Overview, 11 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1185
(1983).
20. Katzmann, The Underlying Concerns, in JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS,
supra note 4, at 12.
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the court decision three weeks later.2 ' In another instance, the
Wisconsin legislature reacted quickly after the media drew at-
tention to a Wisconsin Supreme Court opinion interpreting the
rape shield statute as permitting the admission of certain evi-
dence relating to a rape victim's prior sexual conduct.22
This type of prompt legislative reaction to judicial interpre-
tation is probably the exception, however, not the rule. Legis-
lative reexamination of a statute probably depends on whether
the decision attracts adequate attention and creates sufficient
demands on the legislative process to build another majority for
a new enactment. Legislative action will probably occur when
the decision has received media attention, when one or more
legislators or legislative committees become interested in the
subject, when there is near unanimity that the court decision is
wrong, when a powerful interest group or governmental agency
is affected by the decision and seeks legislative relief, or when
the decision arouses passionate response among various constit-
uencies. Controversial decisions tend to engender dialogue be-
tween the courts and the legislature.
When interpreting statutes and deciding cases, should
courts consider how the legislature will react? Some suggest,
for example, that courts should - where the statutory lan-
guage admits of different interpretations - interpret the stat-
ute in favor of those who do not have effective access to the
legislative political process to obtain legislative reconsideration
of judicial interpretation. Recognizing the difficulty in reaching
political consensus in the legislature, should the courts decide
issues when they have the opportunity to do so because the leg-
21. The court's decision in People ex rel Deukmejian v. County of
Mendocino, 36 Cal. 3d 476, 683 P.2d 1150, 204 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1984), was over-
turned by 1984 Cal. Stat. 1386. The legislature stated:
It is the intent of the Legislature by this act to overturn the holding
of People ex rel George Deukmejian v. County of Mendocino, et al.,
and to reassert the Legislature's intention that matters relating to
economic poisons are of a statewide interest and concern and are to be
administered on a statewide basis by the state unless specific excep-
tions are made in state legislation for local administration.
1d. § 3.
The Colorado legislature, COLO. REV. STAT. § 26-1-126.5 (1989), expressly
rejected an interpretation of a statute in the Colorado Supreme Court decision
entitled Colorado Dep't of Social Services v. Board of County Comm'rs, 697
P.2d 1, 23 (Colo. 1985).
22. For the judicial and legislative history of this interpretation, see State
v. Gavigan, 111 Wis. 2d 150, 156-59, 330 N.W.2d 571, 575-76 (1983); State v.
Vonesh, 135 Wis. 2d 477, 485-87, 401 N.W.2d 170, 174-75 (Ct. App. 1986); Galvin,
Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A Proposal for the
Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REV. 763, 874 & n.532 (1986).
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islature may not, for political reasons, be able to act?23 Judicial
recognition that an audience exists beyond the litigants and the
courts raises important questions regarding the court's appro-
priate role in influencing the legislative process.
Should the courts use their opinions as a vehicle to draw
legislative attention to statutory deficiencies? As mentioned
previously, courts are concerned about the clarity, coherence,
23. In In re Guardianship of Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 307 N.W.2d 881
(1981), a majority of the Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that, in the ab-
sence of specific statutory authorization, state courts should not order the ster-
ilization of a mentally disabled 19-year-old woman. Id at 578-79, 307 N.W.2d at
899. One member, in concurrence, argued that "[s]uch authority should be
granted only after a thorough consideration of the moral, medical, psychologi-
cal and ethical, as well as the legal, implications of sterilization and its after-
effects. The only proper forum for such a grant of authority is the legisla-
ture." Id. at 585, 307 N.W.2d at 902 (Coffey, J., concurring). One dissenter cas-
tigated the majority, arguing that it failed to address the issue:
Two thousand years ago a judge ... sensing the political winds ("Will-
ing to content the people" as the ancient word puts it), washed his
hands and said to the people: "See ye to it." ... Today, the majority of
this Court... turns to the legislature, the "representatives of the peo-
ple," and says in effect, "you see to it." Washing its hands and turning
the demand for justice over to the legislature demeans this court, den-
igrates its role, and makes a mockery of its powers.
The majority cannot be unaware that the legislature will do noth-
ing about this matter. In today's political atmosphere, few, if any,
state legislators would sponsor or support sterilization legislation.
Id. at 593, 307 N.W.2d at 906 (Day, J., dissenting). The Justice concluded that
"[m]aybe some day, even in Wisconsin, those with power to do justice will not
ask for the wash basin." I& at 604, 307 N.W.2d at 911 (Day, J., dissenting). A
second dissenter argued-
I believe my colleague ... is correct in his dissent that legislative ac-
tion on this issue is unlikely. Apart from any aversion legislators may
have to addressing a controversial question, there is the added practi-
cal problem of the press of legislative business.... I am prepared to
assume that even if legislative action were taken, it would [establish
guidelines for sterilization].
Id at 605, 307 N.W.2d at 911 (Callow, J., dissenting).
Should the court choose a particular solution in the hope of fostering leg-
islative action? In 1977, the Texas Supreme Court observed that Texas's modi-
fied comparative negligence rule governed only cases sounding in negligence.
General Motors v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 862 (Tex. 1977). Other tort cases
were controlled by older statutes requiring a pro rata allocation among joint
tortfeasors. Id. The court invited further legislative study. Id at 863. Four
years later, the legislature responded, but its attempts to adopt comparative
fault in strict liability cases failed on the floor of the senate. Sanders & Joyce,
"Off to the Races":. The 1980s Tort Crisis and the Law Reform Process, 27
Hous. L. REv. 207, 286 (1990). The court then chose, in 1984, to adopt pure
comparative fault in liability cases not sounding in negligence. Duncan v.
Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 429 (Tex. 1984). That second case is gen-
erally credited with creating the political momentum necessary to pass a com-
parative responsibility rule that is now the law in Texas. Sanders & Joyce,
supra, at 286.
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and responsiveness of statutes. "Bad law breeds unnecessarily
hard cases."24
Some courts have attempted to alert the legislature to a
problem in the statutes without advising the legislature of the
court's policy preferences in repairing the statute. The Minne-
sota Revisor of Statutes made this point expressly when he re-
ported to the legislature that although the Minnesota Supreme
Court will readily criticize a statute, it is reluctant to offer spe-
cific suggestions for change. The Revisor's report commented:
"Perhaps this is as it should be."' 2 For example, in a 1987
worker's compensation case, the Minnesota Supreme Court
wrote that the appeal procedures were a trap for the unwary
and that "[ilt would seem the situation deserves some review
and revision [by the legislature]." 26
The highest courts of New York and Illinois have also re-
cently followed this approach. In a New York Court of Appeals
decision voiding the natural parents' consent to an adoption and
returning the adopted child to the natural parents, Judge
Judith Kaye, writing for the court, advised the legislature that
it should take another look at the adoption laws. Judge Kaye
wrote:
[W]e note that the [legislative] reforms ... were motivated by the
Legislature's concern that controversy and uncertainty overhung
adoptions .... [We believe it would be highly desirable for the Legis-
lature to examine [the statute] in the light of 13 years' experience, for
it appears that the well-founded concerns that engendered the law are
not yet dispelled.27
An Illinois Supreme Court opinion suggested that the legisla-
ture consider the conflict created by structured settlements in
personal injury cases and the Hospital Lien Act.28
In these cases, the courts were merely alerting the legisla-
ture to a problem. Judges are divided on the propriety of sug-
24. Ginsburg & Huber, supra note 9, at 1417.
25. MINNESOTA REVISOR OF STATUTES, REPORT CONCERNING CERTAIN
OPINIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT 2 (Nov. 1988) [hereinafter MINNESOTA
REPORT].
26. Bjerga v. Maslin Transp. & Carriers Ins. Co., 400 N.W.2d 99, 100
(Minn. 1987). The Minnesota Revisor of Statutes called the opinion to the leg-
islature's attention. See MINNESOTA REPORT, supra note 25, at 6.
27. In re Sarah K, 66 N.Y. 2d 223, 242, 487 N.E.2d 241, 251 (1985).
28. In re Estate of Cooper, 125 Ill. 2d 363, 370, 532 N.E.2d 236, 239 (1988).
The Illinois Legislative Reference Bureau included this case in its Annual Re-
view of Reported Decisions, which is required by statute. See ILLINOIS LEGIS-
LATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, ANNUAL REVIEW OF THE REPORTED DECISIONS OF
THE FEDERAL COURTS, THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT AND ILLINOIS APPEALS
COURT vi, 72 (1989).
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gesting policy to the legislature. In a product liability case,
Justice Coffey, writing for himself and two members of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, recommended that the legislature
consider making the statute of limitations run from the date
the defective product was manufactured rather than from the
date of injury.- Four justices disassociated themselves from
this suggestion saying:
It is presumptuous for this court, which does not and cannot have the
benefit of public hearings and constituent expression of opinion, to
"commend" sua sponte any specific change in the applicable period of
limitations. It is enough for us to note that the determination of a pe-
riod of limitations in respect to products liability presents a substan-
tial problem, worthy of the legislature's consideration.
30
Although opinions frequently call for legislative action,
judges' influence on statutory change is largely unmeasured.3 1
Even if the legislature responds, judges are often unaware of
the legislation.3 2 While judges might learn about legislative re-
action to court decisions on controversial issues, they know lit-
tle about legislative reaction to opinions in low-profile cases
that propose changes in or ask for assistance interpreting
statutes.
As calls increase for institutional mechanisms to mediate
between the legislature and the courts, the effectiveness of ju-
dicial attempts to improve the quality of statutes through dia-
logue in written opinions has to be carefully studied. Opinions
29. Kozlowski v. John E. Smith's Sons Co., 87 Wis. 2d 882, 903-04, 275
N.W.2d 915, 924-25 (1979).
30. Id. at 904-05, 275 N.W.2d at 927 (Heffernan, Day, Abrahamson & Cal-
low, JJ., concurring).
31. For discussion of congressional responses to United States Supreme
Court opinions interpreting federal statutes, see W. MURPHY, CONGRESS AND
THE COURT (1962); C. PRITcHETT, CONGRESS VERSUS THE SUPREME COURT,
1957-60 (1961); Hellman, Case Selection in the Burger Court- A Preliminary
Inquiry, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 947 (1985); Henschen, supra note 16; Stumpf,
Congressional Response to Supreme Court Rulings: The Interaction of Law
and Politics, 14 J. PUB. L. 377 (1965); Note, Congressional Reversal of Supreme
Court Decisions: 1945-57, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1324 (1958). There appears to be
little congressional response to court of appeals decisions.
32. The communications gap makes it difficult for the judiciary to keep
abreast of statutory changes. N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1987, at A31, col. 3. Con-
gressional staff believe it would be useful if courts could be informed of the
actions taken, if any, by Congress in response to judicial decisions interpreting
statutes. R. Katzmann, supra note 11, at 325. Former Judge Kenneth W.
Starr took a different view: "It is nice to know, but from our standpoint, we
do not need to know what specific action Congress takes on a particular case
once that case leaves our court." K. Starr, Remarks at the Proceedings of the
Forty-ninth Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit (May 22-
24, 1988), reprinted in 124 F.R.D. 241, 334 (1989).
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may be ineffective in stimulating legislative change partly be-
cause few judges understand the legislative process or the
mechanisms the legislature uses to monitor judicial opinions.33
Judges and scholars have generally ignored legislative reaction
to judicial decisions in unemotional, low-profile cases. If the
courts attempt to improve the legislative product by engaging
the legislature in a discourse, courts must identify and commu-
nicate with the persons and entities who are capable of stimu-
lating legislative response to court opinions interpreting
statutes. Like a good dancer, the judge must know his or her
partner and the dance floor.
II. LEGISLATIVE DISCOURSE WITH THE COURTS
REGARDING STATUTES
We now shift our vantage point from the courts to the leg-
islature. How does the legislature view the courts and judicial
opinions interpreting statutes? Do legislators even read judicial
opinions? Are there audiences or forums a court should at-
tempt to address through a judicial opinion?
In their effort to modernize, clarify, or correct the common
law and statutes, many state legislatures have developed one or
more institutional mechanisms to take a second look at statutes
in light of court decisions. Unfortunately, even as judges and
scholars call for congressional oversight committees, the states'
experiences with similar institutions remain unexplored.
The majority of the states have mechanisms -- some for-
mally established by statute, many informal - for monitoring
judicial opinions interpreting statutes. In several states, there
are a number of oversight mechanisms in place serving differ-
ent constituencies both within and outside state government.
The names of the entities and their powers differ from state to
state. As one might expect, state efforts are simultaneously
similar and different. The mechanisms reflect the political and
legal cultures in which they exist.
We shall set forth some of the major actors and structural
33. For example, Judge Ginsburg reports that, although created 12 years
earlier, she first became aware of the House of Representatives Office of Law
Revision Counsel while working on her lecture on legislative oversight. Gins-
burg, supra note 10, at 1015. Justice Abrahamson became aware of the Wis-
consin Law Revision Committee, the legislative oversight mechanism in
Wisconsin, several years after it was established in 1979. She had not ex-
amined any of its reports on Wisconsin cases before working on this lecture.
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components that exist in the states to help the legislature re-
view statutes in light of judicial decisions.
A. ExEcuTivE OVERSIGHT MECHANISMS ASSISTING THE
LEGISLATURE
In many states the office of the attorney general monitors
judicial opinions to some extent to determine the need for legis-
lative reform. This role takes several forms, depending in large
part on the statutory provisions for oversight, the litigation re-
sponsibility of the office and the interests of the individual at-
torney general.
In a few states a statute directs the attorney general to ex-
amine judicial decisions to determine their effect on state stat-
utes and to suggest legislative action.34 In Oklahoma the
attorney general is responsible for reporting to the legislature
on judicial decisions that declare statutes unconstitutional. $5 In
South Carolina the attorney general is responsible for reporting
on the proper and efficient administration of criminal law,
which includes monitoring court decisions.3 6
The North Carolina statutes give the attorney general a
significant role in legislative revision. The Division of Legisla-
tive Drafting and Codification of Statutes is part of North Caro-
lina's Department of Justice. At the request of the governor,
state officials, and members of the General Assembly, the Divi-
sion prepares bills for presentation to the legislature.3 7 The Di-
34. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 44.23.020(b)(6)(B) (1989) (attorney general
shall "make a report to the legislature, through the governor, at each regular
legislative session ... on needed legislation or amendments to existing law");
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 16.05 (West 1990) (attorney general shall make a written re-
port to the governor before the convening of the legislature "as to the effect
and operation of the acts of the last previous session, the decisions of the
courts thereon... with such suggestions as in his opinion the public interest
may demand .... "). In contrast, several attorneys general wrote that the of-
fice plays little or no role in suggesting legislation to address court decisions.
Many attorneys general also issue opinions to state officers and agencies inter-
preting statutes. Some states' legislative oversight mechanisms examine not
only judicial decisions, but opinions of the attorney general.
35. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 20a (West 1988). Although many of our re-
spondents discuss the legislature's mechanisms for dealing with judicial deci-
sions declaring a statute unconstitutional, we have not included this subject in
this article. The attorney general's office, the legislative support agencies, and
the legislature itself appear to have more mechanisms to handle cases declar-
ing statutes unconstitutional than to handle decisions interpreting or criticiz-
ing statutes.
36. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-7-140 (Law. Co-op 1986).
37. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 114-9(1) (1987).
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vision maintains a system of continuous statutory research and
correction to keep the statutes "as clear, as concise and as com-
plete as possible" and to reduce to a minimum "the amount of
construction and interpretation of the statutes required of the
courts."
3 8
In most states the attorney general communicates infor-
mally - without a statutory mandate - with the legislative
and executive branches about court decisions. Many attorneys
general monitor court opinions as part of their criminal case
load or as part of their work advising and representing state
agencies in litigation.39 The legal work of the office furnishes a
good, practical basis for evaluating and recommending statutory
changes. In a substantial number of states, state agencies,
whether represented by the attorney general or by house coun-
sel, monitor judicial decisions affecting the agency's work and
communicate with the legislature directly or through the attor-
ney general.4 °
B. LEGISLATIVE STAFF OVERSIGHT MECHANISMS
Several state legislatures have established formal mecha-
nisms - revisors of statutes, staff counsel, and legislative draft-
ing and research agencies - to inform their committees of
judicial opinions interpreting statutes, and many state legisla-
tures have the benefit of informal processes.41
A revisor of statutes is legislatively created in many states
and is typically mandated to study, compare, and analyze the
statutes and report to each regular session of the legislature,
38. Id& Letter from Floyd M. Lewis, Ass't Attorney General, Revisor of
Statutes, North Carolina Dep't of Justice, to the Hon. Shirley S. Abrahamson,
Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court (May 16, 1990) (on file with authors)
[hereinafter Lewis Letter]. According to Lewis, there is no formal means of
monitoring court decisions; court decisions are brought to the attention of the
Department's Legislative Liaison and to attorneys who represent specific sub-
ject matter areas in Department. Usually legislative changes in response to
court decisions occur only in areas of capital punishment, criminal evidence,
and patient abuse. I&
39. Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Penn-
sylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and Wyoming.
40. Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, Ne-
braska, New Hampshire, New York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas, and
Virginia.
41. States reporting no formal case screening and reporting oversight pro-
cess include Arizona, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming.
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calling particular attention to errors, duplications, and conflicts
in the statutes, along with recommendations for corrections.4
The roles of many revisors of statutes and legislative support
agencies are limited to clarification of the statutes and improve-
ment of the technical quality of statutes without changing the
substance of the statute. This technical role includes a mini-
mum of oversight of judicial opinions. Technical corrections
not involving substantive modifications are ordinarily incorpo-
rated in a single correction bill, which the legislature usually
then adopts.43
On the other hand, some statutes require revisors of stat-
utes, legislative support agencies, legislative counsels, legisla-
tive councils, legislative reference bureaus, and statutory
revision committees to report to the legislature regarding stat-
utes that they believe have been declared unconstitutional or
otherwise affected by judicial decisions. These reports take a
variety of forms.44
In Montana, the Code Commissioner must submit a report
42. See, e.g., CoLO. REV. STAT. §§ 2-3-703, 2-5-104 (1980); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 23G-2D (1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 46-1211 (1986); MINN. STAT. § 3C.04(4)
(1990); MISS. CODE ANN. § 7-5-11 (1972); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 220.080
(Michie 1986).
In North Carolina the revisor of the statutes is a member of the Attorney
General's staff. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 114-9.1 (1987). See Lewis Letter, supra note
38. Although the Nebraska statute requires the revisor to report to the legisla-
tive council (composed of all the members of the legislature) about "defects in
the Constitution and laws of Nebraska," NEB. REV. STAT. § 49-702 (1988), it has
not been the revisor's practice to cover court decisions construing statutes.
Letter from Joanne M. Pepperl, Nebraska Revisor of Statutes, to Hon. Shirley
S. Abrahamson, Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court (May 11, 1990) (on
file with authors) [hereinafter Pepperl Letter].
43. Some legislative support agencies reported that they discover the cases
when they prepare annotations to the statutes, and that one means of present-
ing the cases to the legislature is in the preparation of the annotations.
44. For example, the Code Reviser of the State of Washington reports to
the "Statute Law Committee," WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1.08.001, 1.08.025
(1988), with recommendations for bills to correct statutes. The Committee ap-
proves or rejects each recommendation. After approval, the correction bills
are submitted to the legislature for enactment; the majority are enacted. The
Arkansas Code Revision Commission is required to make studies of the stat-
utes and judicial decisions to identify deficiencies "which contribute to indefi-
niteness of interpretation of the purpose of those laws or the legislative intent
thereof." ARK. STAT. ANN. § 1-2-303(c)(1)(D) (1987). The Commission is
rather new at this task, but in 1989 it proposed § 11, Act 821 of 1989, which
rewrote ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-14-806(a) (1987) on recording liens in light of
Union Nat'l Bank v. Hooper, 295 Ark. 83, 746 S.W. 2d 550 (1988). Letter from
Vincent C. Henderson II, Executive Director, Arkansas Code Revision Com-
mission, to Hon. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court (May 22, 1990) (on file with authors).
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to the legislative council indicating the Commissioner's recom-
mendations for legislation to eliminate archaic or outdated
laws, eliminate redundant wording of laws, clarify existing laws
and correct errors and inconsistencies within the laws.45 The
report cites judicial decisions and recommends a solution. The
legislative council then distributes the report to all legislators.46
Any legislator can call on the Commissioner to have any item
in the report drafted in the form of a bill;47 individual legisla-
tors request most items in the report as bills.4
The Illinois Legislative Reference Bureau reviews all re-
ported decisions of federal courts and the Illinois appellate
courts that affect the interpretation of statutes; it reports the
results of its research to the General Assembly by October 1 of
each year. The report recommends any necessary technical
corrections in the laws to comply with the decisions and "may
point out where substantive issues arise, without making any
judgment thereon."49 The last report, dated December 21, 1989,
is a 137-page description of cases by subject matter containing
no suggestions for statutory revision.
The Minnesota Revisor of Statutes makes a "report to the
legislature every other year of any statutory changes recom-
mended or discussed or statutory deficiencies noted in any opin-
ion of the supreme court of Minnesota."50 In November 1988,
the Minnesota Revisor reported on fewer than ten cases. He
recently stopped making recommendations to the legislature,
45. MoNT. CODE ANN. § 1-11-204(3) (1989).
46. The report for the 1989 legislative session listed 15 proposals for legis-
lative action.
47. The introductory paragraph of the report submitted to legislators for
the 1989 legislative session states:
One of the duties of the Code Commissioner is to prepare a report in-
dicating recommendations for legislation. The Code Commissioner
Bill has traditionally contained only nonsubstantive material neces-
sary to correct errors and inconsistencies in the Montana Code Anno-
tated. I have determined that the following items require the
determination of substantive questions, and are therefore not proper
for inclusion in the Code Commissioner Bill. Traditionally this list
has been given to the Judiciary Committees after the session has con-
vened; however due to the time constraints involved, that procedure
did not work well. The following items are recommended for legisla-
tive action. Please contact me ... if you would like to submit a bill
drafting request on any item.
Report on suggested legislation prepared by Gregory J. Petesch, Montana
Code Commissioner, sent to Hon. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Justice of the Wis-
consin Supreme Court (May 1, 1990) (on file with authors).
48. I&
49. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 63, 29.5 (1985).
50. MIN. STAT. § 3C.04(3) (1990).
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concluding that the "legislature has shown a reluctance to ac-
cept the suggestions for change accompanying the [revisor's] re-
port for the last two reporting periods. The Legislature appears
to have rightfully believed that, in almost every instance, more
than one possible solution to a statutory problem is feasible. It
is mainly for these reasons that no recommendations for legis-
lation accompany this report."' 51
A number of states have developed more formal inter-
agency systems for legislative oversight that directly involve
legislators in the process of statutory review in light of judicial
decisions. For example, Alaska's Legislative Council, a perma-
nent interim committee and service agency of the legislature
composed solely of legislators, is a well-established mechanism
for monitoring state court decisions affecting the Alaska stat-
utes.52 The Council annually examines published opinions of
state and federal courts and submits "a comprehensive report
of annual examination with recommendations" to each member
of the legislature at the start of the regular session.53 The re-
port analyzes cases to determine whether the courts properly
implemented the legislative purposes of the statute, expressed
dissatisfaction with state statutes, or indicated unclear or am-
biguous statutes.M
In one case, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that
reckless driving and negligent driving were lesser-included of-
fenses of driving while intoxicated. The Alaska Legislative
Council recommended that the legislature review the statute
because the court's opinion was long and very technical, raising
complex policy questions that courts face in frequently occur-
ring prosecutions.-
After the Alaska Court of Appeals determined penalties
for violations of the fishery laws by reading the fishery laws in
conjunction with the statutes imposing fines for misdemeanors,
the Legislative Council reported to the legislators that "the
court [of appeals] engaged in measurable rewriting of the stat-
51. MINNESOTA REPORT, supra note 25, at 2.
52. ALASKA STAT. §§ 24.20.010, 24.20.020 (1988). The central legal, adminis-
trative and research staff of the legislature is organized under the legislative
council. Letter from David R. Dierdorff, Revisor of Statutes, to Hon. Shirley
S. Abrahamson, Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court (Apr. 28, 1990) (on
file with authors) [hereinafter Dierdorff Letter].
53. ALASKA STAT. § 24.20.065(b) (1985).
54. ALASKA STAT. § 24.20.065(a) (1985).
55. ALASKA LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS AGENCY, A REPORT TO THE SIXTEENTH
STATE LEGISLATURE EXAMINING COURT DECISIONS AND OPINIONS OF THE AT-
TORNEY GENERAL CONSTRUING ALASKA STATUTES 30-32 (Nov. 1989).
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ute to achieve the result achieved. While the result is probably
consistent with apparent legislative intent, [legislative] review
is recommended."-'
If the legislative response will involve a significant policy
decision, an Alaskan legislator or committee will introduce a
bill in response to the court decision. If the response will in-
volve merely a technical correction of a statute, the technical
response or clarification is included in the annual revisor's bill,
which the Revisor of Statutes prepares and which the legisla-
tive council introduces.5 7
A number of other states also have formal systems for in-
volving legislators in the process of statutory revision in re-
sponse to judicial decisions. In 1979, Wisconsin created its Law
Revision Committee - a statutory committee of the Legislative
Council, composed solely of legislators - to consider judicial
decisions referred by the Revisor of Statutes.-s The Revisor of
Statutes informs the committee of those reported decisions of
any federal district court or any state or federal appellate court
in which Wisconsin statutes or session laws "are stated to be in
conflict, ambiguous, anachronistic, unconstitutional or other-
wise in need of revision."59 After the Revisor notifies the Com-
mittee of the decisions, the staff of the Legislative Council
provides the Committee with a discussion paper analyzing each
decision and the statute involved.60 The discussion paper also
recommends several alternative courses of action in regard to
each decision, such as that the Committee take no action and
allow the court interpretation to stand; that the Committee
propose amending the statute consistent with the court deci-
sion; that the Committee propose amending the statute to over-
turn the court decision; that the Committee refer the case to
the standing committee with jurisdiction over the subject mat-
ter so that the standing committee can decide what to do; or
that the Committee refer the case to the Judicial Council or
56. Id- at 39-40.
57. Dierdorff Letter, supra note 52. The Revisor is a member of the legal
services staff of the legislative council. Id
58. Wis. STAT. § 13.83(1)(c) 1. (1987-88).
59. Wis. STAT. § 13.93(2)(d) (1987-88).
60. The 1989 paper discussed 15 decisions of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court, Wisconsin Court of Appeals, and the federal Court of Appeals of the
Seventh Circuit. The paper was divided into five subject matters: criminal
law, financial institutions and commerce, procedural and civil law, and general
government and government employees. WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL,
LAW REVISION COMMITTEE: CASE AND OPINION REvIEW, DISCUSSION PAPER 89-
1 (Mar. 29, 1989).
1991] 1065
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
some other entity for its study and comment.61 When the Wis-
consin Law Revision Committee concludes that the court inter-
pretation appears to be consistent with the legislative intent, it
generally recommends that no action be taken. If the Commit-
tee concludes that the interpretation appears controversial or
inconsistent with legislative intent, it may refer the matter to a
standing legislative committee. The Committee itself may also
develop and introduce legislation directly into the legislature.6 2
The Wisconsin Law Revision Committee ordinarily proposes a
bill only when the matter is technical and noncontroversial.
The staff advises the Committee on its successes and failures on
the bills the Committee introduces in the legislative session;
the staff does not report on the matters the Committee refers
to the standing committees or other entities.
A statute requires the Oregon Law Improvement Commit-
tee - composed of legislators, law school academics, the
cochairpersons of the Legislative Counsel Committee, and des-
ignees of the State Bar and the Attorney General - to conduct
a continuous, substantive law revision program.63 Staff attor-
neys of the Legislative Counsel Committee assist the Law Im-
provement Committee by examining the published opinions of
the Oregon Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, and Tax Court
to discover and report to the Law Improvement Committee
"any statutory defects, anachronisms or omissions mentioned
therein."' ' The staff attorneys prepare case analyses for the
Committee's review6 5 and, at the request of the Law Improve-
ment Committee, legislative proposals.66 The staff attorneys
also examine suggestions and changes proposed by interested
persons and bring such suggestions and proposals to the atten-
tion of the Law Improvement Committee.6 7
Legislation directs the South Dakota Legislative Research
Council, composed solely of legislators, to make an annual re-
port to the legislature on state and federal court decisions
which have sought to interpret the legislative intent of various South
61. WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, LAW REVISION COMMITTEE: CASE
AND OPINION REVIEW, DISCUSSION PAPER 85-2, at 6-8 (June 6, 1985).
62. Wis. STAT. § 13.83 (1)(c)5. (1987-88).
63. OR. REV. STAT. § 173.315 (1985).
64. OR. REV. STAT. § 173.335(2)(b) (1985).
65. Letter from Thomas G. Clifford, Legislative Counsel, Oregon Legisla-
tive Counsel Committee, to Hon. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Justice of the Wis-
consin Supreme Court (May 10, 1990) (on file with authors) [hereinafter
Clifford Letter].
66. OR. REV. STAT. § 173.335(2)(a) (1985).
67. OR. REV. STAT. § 173.335(2)(c) (1985).
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Dakota statutes. The report may include recommendations for cor-
rective action if it is determined that the opinion of the court may be
adverse to what was intended by the legislature or if the court's opin-
ion has identified an appropriate area for legislative action.ca
The Executive Board of the Council has the power to review
state and federal court opinions and make recommendations,
and it has assigned this task to its Supreme Court Opinion Re-
view Subcommittee.69 The Staff Attorney of the Legislative
Research Council analyzes the decisions for the Supreme Court
Opinion Review Subcommittee, which meets to discuss the
opinions and request draft bills. The Staff Attorney describes
the process as "relatively informal."70
Although several states have formal mechanisms for legis-
lative oversight, many states do not. Several correspondents
advised us that their states were exploring the creation of for-
mal mechanisms for monitoring state court decisions.7' In
states lacking formal processes, legislative support agencies fre-
quently serve as informal clearinghouses for the distribution of
judicial opinions to legislators' legislative committees, and legis-
lative staff interested in a particular subject area.72 Maine pro-
68. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 2-9-1.1 (Supp. 1990).
69. S.D. CODIFMED LAWS ANN. § 2-9-4(8) (1985). Letter from Doug Decker,
Staff Attorney, South Dakota Legislative Research Council, to Hon. Shirley S.
Abrahamson, Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court (May 3, 1990) (on file
with authors) [hereinafter Decker Letter]; Memorandum from Doug Decker,
Staff Attorney, South Dakota Legislative Research Council, to Members of the
Supreme Court Opinion Review Subcommittee (Mar. 10, 1989) (on file with
authors).
70. See supra note 69.
71. In May 1990, Hawaii and Iowa were looking into establishing a mecha-
nism for monitoring state court decisions. Letter from Henry Awana, Assis-
tant Director for Revision of Statutes, Hawaii Legislative Reference Bureau, to
Hon. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court (Apr.
30,1990) (on file with authors); Letter from Paulee Lipsman, Director, Demo-
cratic Research Staff, Iowa House of Representatives, to Hon. Shirley S. Abra-
hamson, Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court (May 2, 1990) (on fie with
authors).
The Maryland Revisor of Statutes wrote that the Department of Legisla-
tive Reference "has been interested in undertaking a closer review of court de-
cisions that affect statutes. .. ." Letter from William G. Somerville, Revisor
of Statutes, Maryland Department of Legislative Reference, to Hon. Shirley S.
Abrahamson, Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court (June 11, 1990) (on file
with authors). Janet Ancel, Vermont Legislative Counsel of the Legislative
Council, wrote that she sees a need for this kind of oversight, but her office
does not have adequate staff to carry it out and no sufficient interest exists
among legislators. Letter from Janet Ancel to Hon. Shirley S. Abrahamson,
Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court (June 1, 1990) (on file with authors).
72. The Colorado Office of Legislative Legal Services receives decisions of
the Colorado Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals on a weekly basis. The
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vides an example. Legislative staff there often bring court
staff reads the opinions and makes copies available to members of the General
Assembly, but the office does not have a regularized procedure for informing
the General Assembly of court decisions. Letter from Charles W. Pike, Revi-
sor of Statutes, Colorado Committee on Legal Services, to Hon. Shirley S.
Abrahamson, Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court (May 14, 1990) (on file
with authors). The Assistant to the President of the Florida State Senate
reads slip opinions and brings them to the attention of legislators. Telephone
conversation with D. Stephen Kahn, Assistant to the President of the Florida
State Senate (May 3, 1990).
The Office of Legislative Counsel of the Georgia Legislative Services Com-
mittee reviews advance sheets of court decisions and occasionally will bring
suggested changes to the attention of legislators in particularly compelling cir-
cumstances, but this action is not pursuant to a formally established program.
Letter from Sewell R. Brumby, Legislative Counsel, Office of Georgia Legisla-
tive Counsel, to Hon. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Justice of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court (May 2, 1990) (on file with authors); Letter from James W.
Mullins, Research Office, Georgia House of Representatives, to Hon. Shirley S.
Abrahamson, Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court (May 30, 1990) (on file
with authors). The legislative attorneys of the Indiana Legislative Services
Agency keep abreast of judicial developments in their respective subject areas,
but cases are not routinely brought to the attention of legislators. Letter from
Arden R. Chilcote, Executive Director, Indiana Legislative Services Agency, to
Hon. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court (May 1,
1990) (on file with authors).
Staff of both the Kansas Legislative Research Department and the Revi-
sor's Office often inform legislators of federal and state court decisions that af-
fect state laws. Letter from Richard W. Ryan, Director, Kansas Legislative
Research Department, to Hon. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Justice of the Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court (Apr. 17, 1990) (on file with authors).
The Kentucky Legislative Research Commission regularly reviews judicial
decisions interpreting statutes and informally reports the decisions to commit-
tee chairs. Telephone conversation with John M. Spangler, Reviser of Stat-
utes, Kentucky Legislative Research Commission (Apr. 27, 1990).
As a matter of office practice the Nebraska Revisor of Statutes circulates
copies of all Nebraska Supreme Court cases to all drafters in the office. Copies
of the case are also circulated to the committee counsels of the various legisla-
tive committees. Pepperl Letter, supra note 42.
The Nevada Legislative Counsel tracks state and federal court decisions
without difficulty because there are few decisions, local attorneys often call
the office to point out the cases, and the office prepares annotations for the
statutes. "If the change required is substantive, we will bring the issue to the
attention of one of the standing committees on judiciary, so that the commit-
tee can request a bill to address the problem." Letter from Lorne J.
Malkiewich, Legislative Counsel, Nevada Legislative Counsel Bureau, to Hon.
Shirley S. Abrahamson, Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court (May 17,
1990) (on file with authors).
The Revisor of Statutes (part of the North Carolina Department of Jus-
tice) identifies and reports court decisions to the North Carolina General Stat-
utes Commission for review for legislative proposals. Lewis Letter, supra note
38.
The North Dakota Legislative Council staff reviews court decisions and
calls them to the attention of the interim Judiciary Committee. Individuals
and organizations communicate their concerns about statutes to the Council
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decisions to the attention of legislative committees, individual
for referral to the Judiciary Committee. Letter from John D. Olsrud, North
Dakota Legislative Council, to Hon. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Justice of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court (May 2, 1990) (on file with authors).
The legal staffs of the Oklahoma House and Senate monitor decisions and
notify the chair of the standing committee having jurisdiction over the subject
matter involved. Letter from Vicki Miles-LaGrange, Chair, Senate Judiciary
Committee, Oklahoma State Senate, to Hon. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Justice
of the Wisconsin Supreme Court (May 17, 1990) (on file with authors) [herein-
after Miles-LaGrange Letter].
The Oregon Legislative Counsel's Office asks the legal staff of the appel-
late courts to notify it of cases discussing lack of clarity, confusion, etc. "Some-
times they do." Memorandum from Thomas G. Clifford, Oregon Legislative
Counsel's Office, to Hon. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Justice of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court (undated, received May 1990) (on file with authors).
Pennsylvania legislative personnel keep informed through advance sheets.
Letter from Kathleen Eakin, Counsel, Pennsylvania Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee, to Hon. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court
(May 7, 1990) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Eakin Letter]. Each of the
four Pennsylvania legislative caucuses employs legal counsel; one of their
functions is to monitor court decisions that impact on Pennsylvania's statutes.
Letter from Clancy Myer, Parliamentarian, Pennsylvania House of Represent-
atives, to Hon. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court (May 2, 1990) (on file with authors).
The Utah Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel is responsi-
ble by statute for making "recommendations for the revision, clarification,
classification" of the statutes and "to develop proposed legislation to effectuate
the recommendations." The process of monitoring court cases is informal.
When staff attorneys become aware of cases, they bring them to legislators' at-
tention and prepare legislation based on legislators' responses. Letter from M.
Gay Taylor, Utah Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel, to Hon.
Shirley S. Abrahamson, Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court (May 3, 1990)
(on file with authors).
The Virginia Division of Legislative Services is not directly responsible for
monitoring state court decisions and recommending statutory revision but fre-
quently performs this function on an informal basis, "either in the course of
advising standing committee chairmen of significant issues in advance of the
legislative session or while engaged in research activities for a legislative study
committee or an individual legislator." Letter from Mary P. Devine, Staff At-
torney, Virginia Division of Legislative Services, to Hon. Shirley S. Abraham-
son, Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court (June 29, 1990) (on file with
authors).
In Washington, the role of monitoring court decisions that may require
modification of statutory provisions has fallen primarily to the staffs of the
standing legislative committees. Letter from Roderick N. McAulay, Counsel,
Washington State Senate Law and Justice Committee, to Hon. Shirley S.
Abrahamson, Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court (May 8, 1990) (on file
with authors).
The staff attorney of the West Virginia Legislative Services informally re-
views cases and may notify the chairs of standing legislative committees or
may open a bill request file to correct or clarify statute. Letter from Joanna I.
Tabit, West Virginia Ass't Attorney General, to Hon. Shirley S. Abrahamson,
Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court (June 8, 1990) (on file with authors);
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legislators, and the chairs of the Joint Standing Committee on
the Judiciary. Individual legislators may then introduce bills to
amend the statutes. 73
C. LAW REVISION COMMISSIONS AND LAW INSTITUTES
ASSISTING THE LEGISLATURE
Several states have established permanent entities - gen-
erally called law revision conlmissions or law institutes -
charged with studying and proposing revisions of the statutes.
Law revision commissions have their roots in the codification
movement at the turn of the century. In their modern form,
they respond to Judge (later Justice) Cardozo's74 and Dean
Pound's call for a ministry of justice.7 5 The New York Law Re-
vision Commission, formed in 1934, proclaims itself to be the
oldest continuous agency in the world devoted to law reform
through legislation.76
Telephone conversation with Randy Elkins of West Virginia Legislative Serv-
ices (May 11, 1990).
73. Letter from Cheryl Ring, Principal Analyst, Maine Committee on Au-
dit and Program Review, to Hon. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Justice of the Wis-
consin Supreme Court (May 2, 1990) (on file with authors); Letter from Julie
S. Jones, Principal Analyst, Maine Committee on Housing and Economic De-
velopment, to Hon. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court (May 1, 1990) (on file with authors).
74. Cardozo, supra note 4.
75. Pound, Anachronisms, supra note 7. The Public Law Research Insti-
tute at Hastings College of Law prepares memoranda on topics submitted by
officials in state government.
The Institute is not directed primarily towards policy analysis nor the
drafting of legislation; its function is to answer the legal inquiry put
to us with full professional competence. Very often these inquiries
will deal with some recent Court decision and its possible effect on
existing practices and doctrines.... The services of the Institute do
not duplicate the work of the legislative analyst or legislative counsel
at Sacramento. Our function, as I see it, is to focus the total resources
of our library and its excellent staff together with our students' ef-
forts in assisting California State Government. The work is excellent
training for our students, and the State, I suspect, is encouraged at the
rare sight of consultants themselves paying for the privilege of
consulting!
Letter from Julian H. Levi, Professor of Law, University of California, Has-
tings College of Law, to Hon. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Justice of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court (May 2, 1990) (on file with authors).
76. NEW YoRK LAW REvIsION COMMISSION REPORT FOR 1989 No. 65, at 2
(1989) [hereinafter NEW YORK REPORT]. For commentary on law revision
commissions, see, e.g., Barnes, The Law Revision Commission of Canada, 2
DALHOUSIE L.J. 62 (1975); Bowker, Alberta's Institute of Law Research and Re-
form, 11 CAN. B.J. 341 (1968); Fins, The Illinois Law Revision Commission, 29
DE PAuL L. REv. 443 (1980); Friedland, The Work of the Law Reform Commis-
sion of Canada, 6 L.S.C.U. GAZ. 58 (1972); Gosse, Canadian Law Reform Agen-
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The commissions are usually composed of representatives
of the legislative, judicial, and executive branches of govern-
ment, law schools and bar associations, and public members.
Statutes generally authorize them to work in four areas: (1)
examination of the common law, statutes, and current judicial
decisions of the state to discover defects and anachronisms in
the law and recommend needed reforms; (2) consideration of
proposed changes in the law recommended by the American
Law Institute, the commissioners for the promotion of uniform-
ity of legislation in the United States, bar associations, or any
other learned bodies; (3) consideration of suggestions from
judges, justices, public officials, lawyers, and the general public
regarding defects and anachronisms in the law; and (4) consid-
eration of changes in the law necessary to modify or eliminate
antiquated, inequitable rules of law and to bring the civil and
criminal law of the state into harmony with modern
conditions.77
Law revision commissions generally engage in major revi-
sions of specific areas of law rather than monitor individual ju-
dicial decisions. In this revision function, the commissions
cies, 1 J. CAN. B. ASSN. 1 (1970); Linde, Law Revision in Oregon, 20
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 211 (1984); MacDonald, Organization for Law Reform, 31
ALA. LAW. 33 (1970); MacDonald, Legal Research Translated into Legislative
Action, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 401 (1963); MacDonald, The New York Law Revision
Commission: The Past and the Future, 13 ST. Louis U.L.J. 258 (1968); Paul &
Clapp, Legal Research and Legal Development The Role of 5 New Jersey Law
Institute, 28 RUTGERS L. REV. 1053 (1975); Selinger, The West Virginia Law
Institute. Uniting the Legal Community to Modernize State Law, 91 W. VA. L.
REV. 211 (1989); Skene, The Nova Scotia Law Reform Advisory Commission:
An Early Appraisal, 2 DALHOUSIE L.J. 201 (1975); Smith, The Role of the Loui-
siana State Law Institute in Law Improvement and Reform, 16 LA. L. REv.
689 (1956); Steck, California Legislation: Sources Unlimited, 6 PAc. L.J. 537,
549-51 (1975); Zengel, Civil Code Revision in Louisiana, 54 TUL. L. REv. 942
(1980); Note, A Survey of the District of Columbia Law Revision Commission,
34 CATH. U.L. REv. 1309 (1985); Note, The Law Revision Commission, 3 HAav.
J. ON LEG Is. 361 (1966) (bibliography on law revision commissions). For pro-
posals for a federal law revision commission see Keefe, Twenty-Nine Distinct
Damnations of the Federal Practice - And a National Ministry of Justice, 7
VAND. L. REV. 636 (1954).
77. See, ag., ALA. CODE §§ 29-8-1 to -5 (1989); ALASKA STAT. § 24.20.075
(1985); CAL. CODE §§ 10300-10340 (West 1980); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 2-85
to -88 (West 1988); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 13.90-.988 (West 1990); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 24:201-24:208 (West 1989); MIcH. COmp. LAws ANN. §§ 4.1401-.1403
(West Supp. 1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 1:12A-8 to -9 (West Supp. 1990); N.Y.
LEGIS. LAW §§ 70-72 (McKinney 1952); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1.30.010 to
.060.
In Tennessee, the Law Revision Commission's risponsibilities were trans-
ferred to the Office of Legal Services for the General Assembly. TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 3-12-101 to -108 (1985 & Supp. 1990).
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incidentally perform an oversight function.78 Some law revi-
sion commissions, however, expressly undertake an oversight
function by monitoring individual opinions.79 For example, the
Michigan Law Revision Commission relies on its members, the
academic legal community, the general legal community, and
others to keep it informed of important judicial decisions.80
Members of the Commission have discussed changing their pro-
cedures to enable the Commission to take an even more active
role in proposing legislation in response to court decisions.8'
D. STATUTORILY MANDATED JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT
MECHANISMS TO ASSIST THE LEGISLATURE
In a few states a statute or the constitution imposes an offi-
cial oversight function on the judiciary. The courts notify the
legislature formally - that is, apart from the text of the judi-
cial decision - of inconsistencies or anachronisms in the law.
A statute imposes on the Mississippi Supreme Court justices
the "extra duty" of making a special study of existing laws and
reporting to each regular session of the legislature those con-
structive suggestions they may deem necessary for the improve-
ment of the administration of justice. The statute also imposes
on the chancery and circuit court judges the "extra duty" of
making a special study of existing laws relating to trial courts
and reporting to the supreme court constructive suggestions for
the improvement of justice, which the supreme court shall rec-
ommend to the legislature.8 2 According to the Mississippi
78. The New Jersey Law Revision Commission's project to amend the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act was suggested by the opinion in DiMaria v. Board
of Trustees of the Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys., 225 N.J. Super. 341, 349,
542 A.2d 498, 502 (App. Div. 1988). See NEw JERSEY LAW REVISION COMMIS-
SION, 1989 ANNUAL REPORT 5 (Feb. 1, 1990) [hereinafter NEw JERSEY REPORT].
79. The New York Law Revision Commission appears to review appellate
decisions and study their impact. See NEw YoRK REPORT, supra note 76, at 19;
see also supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing study of state law on
extra-judicial consent forms in adoption).
80. Michigan has no formal process for identifying court decisions that
comment on Michigan laws. Letter from Gary Brian Gulliver, Director of
Legal Research, Michigan Legislative Service Bureau, to Hon. Shirley S. Abra-
hamson, Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court (May 15, 1990) (on file with
authors) [hereinafter Gulliver Letter].
81. Id
82. MisS. CODE ANN. § 25-3-35 (Supp. 1990). The extra duty is tied to sal-
ary. The statute provides:
For such extra services each Justice, from and after July 1, 1989, shall
receive a sum sufficient when added to the present salaries of said
Justices to aggregate Seventy-seven Thousand Dollars ($77,000.00) for
the Chief Justice, Seventy-six Thousand Four Hundred Dollars
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Court Administrator, the study has centered on the court's
monitoring of proposed legislation with input to relevant legis-
lative committees concerning the likely impact of particular
legislation on the operation of the courts. 83
The Idaho Constitution provides that state district judges
shall report in writing to the supreme court by July 1 each year
noting "such defects or omissions in the laws as their knowl-
edge and experience may suggest."s4 The chief justice records
the observations of the trial bench and those of the supreme
court in an annual written report. The chief justice's annual
report is relatively brief,s5 and it "tends to focus on mechanical,
($76,400.00) for the Presiding Justice, and Seventy-five Thousand
Eight Hundred Dollars ($75,800.00) for Associate Justices, per annum.
As each existing term expires and the above-captioned salaries be-
come effective in due course, the extra duties and compensation pro-
vided for shall cease.
Ic
83. Letter from Amy Whitten, Counsel and Court Administrator, Missis-
sippi Supreme Court, to Hon. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Justice of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court (Mar. 8, 1991) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Whitten Let-
ter]. Ms. Whitten further advised us: "[Tihe Supreme Court collects informa-
tion on those opinions released which contain language highlighting needs in
particular areas of the law. This information is provided on request to the ju-
diciary committees of both the Senate and the House of Representatives." 1d.
Most supreme courts have power to promulgate rules governing pleading
and practice. The power may be exclusive of the legislature or exercised con-
currently with the legislature. Judicial rule making can be a form of dialogue
between the two branches, a method for judicial remedying of statutes and a
source of tension. See, e.g., WIs. STAT. § 752.12 (1989-90). For discussions of ju-
dicial rule making and pleading and practice, see C. GRAU, JUDICIAL
RULEMAKmNG: ADImSTRATION, AccEss AND ACCOUNTABmTY (1978); D.
PUGH, C. KORBAKES, J. ALFN & C. GRAU, JUDICIAL RULEmAKNG: A COM-
PENDIUM (1984); Ashman, Measuring the Judicial Rule-Making Power, 59 Ju-
DICATURE 215 (1975); Grau, Who Rules the Courts?: The Issue of Access to the
Rulemaking Process, 62 JUDICATURE 428 (1979); Kay, The Rule-Making Au-
thority and Separation of Powers in Connecticut, 8 CONN. L. REV. 1, 28 (1975);
Levin & Amsterdam, Legislative Control over Judicial Rulemaking: A Prob-
lem in Constitutional Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1958); Sunderland, Im-
plementing the Rule-Making Power, 25 N.Y.U. L. REV. 27 (1950); Note,
Exclusive Judicial Power to Regulate Appellate Practice and Procedure
People v. Cox, 30 DE PAUL L. REV. 969 (1981); Note, Judicial v. Legislative
Power in Kentucky: A "Comity" of Errors, 71 Ky. L.J. 829 (1983); Note, An
Inevitable Clash of Power? Determining the Proper Role of the Legislature in
the Administration of Justice, 22 S.D.L. REv. 387 (1977).
84. IDAHo CoNsT. art. V, § 25.
85. The 1988 Report suggested changes in the following areas: juvenile
sentencing statutes, penalties for juvenile alcohol and tobacco possession, in-
terest rates on judgments under the new tort reform act; notice by mail in
change of name actions; allowing temporary driving privileges to attend DWI
treatment programs; clarify maximum penalty for crimes against nature; and
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housekeeping measures."' 6 The chief justice forwards the re-
port to the governor, who transmits it to the legislature with
his annual message.
The chief justice of the Illinois Supreme Court submits an
annual report to the General Assembly, which each member of
the house and the senate receives pursuant to article VI, section
17 of the Illinois Constitution. The constitution states that
"[t]he Supreme Court shall provide by rule for an annual judi-
cial conference to consider the work of the courts and to sug-
gest improvements in the administration of justice and shall
report thereon annually in writing to the General Assembly
not later than January 31." The Supreme Court's Annual Re-
port to the Illinois General Assembly included thirteen new
legislative recommendations.8 7 One recommendation referred
to the Supreme Court's decision in In re Estate of Longeway,88
a case involving the guardian's power to refuse artificial suste-
nance on behalf of a ward. In the opinion the court stated that
certain guidelines should be followed "until [there is] legislative
action directing otherwise."8 9 The chief justice's report to the
legislature, echoing the concerns of the court's opinion and the
dissenting opinions, noted that "[t]he legislature is in a better
position than are the courts to resolve the sensitive issues
presented in cases of this kind, and the Court, like most other
courts that have pondered these issues, 'invite[s] the legislature
to address this problem.' "90
remove conflicts concerning time limits on appeals or motions for new trial.
IDAHO CHIEF JusTicE 1988 ANNUAL REPORT (Nov. 9, 1988).
86. Letter from John J. McMahon, Chief Deputy, Idaho Attorney Gen-
eral, to Hon. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court
(May 14, 1990) (on file with authors).
87. ILLNOis SUPREME COURT 1990 ANNUAL REPORT pt. 2 (legislative rec-
ommendations) [hereinafter IINOIS ANNUAL REPORT].
88. 133 Ill. 2d 33, 549 N.E.2d 292 (1989).
89. Id. at 55, 549 N.E.2d at 302.
90. ILLINOIS ANNUAL REPORT, supmr note 87, at 1-2 (citation omitted).
The Chief Justice's Annual Report also addresses statutory issues not related
to particular decisions, such as state funding of the courts. Cognizant of legis-
lative-judicial relations, the Chief Justice explained the court's role in his
cover letter as follows:
In making the suggestions contained in this and in prior reports, the
Supreme Court is fully cognizant of the respective roles of the Gen-
eral Assembly and the courts, and does not intend to intrude upon the
prerogatives of the General Assembly in determining what legislation
should be enacted. It is gratifying, however, to note that the General
Assembly over the years has acted to implement many of the sugges-
tions made by the Court. I respectfully submit that the attached sug-
gestions merit the consideration of the General Assembly.
Letter from Chief Justice Thomas J. Moran, Illinois Sup. Ct., to Hon. Michael
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In addition to these formal judicial oversight mechanisms
established by law, some courts and judges communicate in
other ways with legislators.
E. OBSERVATIONS ABOUT OVERSIGHT MECHANISMS
Before we discuss other means of judicial-legislative com-
munication, let us offer eight observations concerning formal
and informal processes enabling legislatures to give statutes a
second look after a judicial decision.
First, the net cast by a formal, legislatively created over-
sight agency can miss judicial opinions that may be of legisla-
tive interest. When the oversight committee has a legislative
mandate, the committee may search rigidly for opinions that
use language that fits its mandate. If the judicial opinion does
not chant the magic words, it may be ignored. A court that
wants to capture the attention of the oversight committee must
be familiar with the work of the committee and target the
court's concerns and comments regarding statutory interpreta-
tion to that committee. 91 Thus, an opinion of the New Jersey
Superior Court specifically mentioned the Law Revision Com-
mission and recommended that the Commission consider
amending the Administrative Procedure Act.92 The Commis-
sion examined the case and drafted proposed legislation.9 3 In
another case, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of
New York criticized the morass of statutory provisions limiting
the time in which the plaintiff may commence a wrongful
death action. The court's opinion expressly called attention to
the situation by naming the New York Law Revision Commis-
sion.94 The Commission took up the issue.95
Some courts have concluded that words in a published
opinion are not sufficient to bring about needed statutory re-
J. Madigan, Speaker, Illinois House of Representatives, and Hon. Philip J.
Reck, President, Illinois Senate (Jan. 26, 1990).
91. For example, the Wisconsin Revisor of Statutes did not report the
Eberhardy decision, supra note 23, to the Wisconsin Law Revision Committee
because the statute requires only a report on cases that comment on existing
statutes. The Eberzardy decision called for legislative action on a topic not
then covered by statute.
92. DiMaria v. Board of Trustees of the Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys.,
225 N.J. Super. 341, 349, 542 A.2d 498, 502 (App. Div. 1988).
93. NEw JERSEY REPORT, supra note 78.
94. Melendez v. Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Operating Auth.,
137 A.D.2d 390, 395, 529 N.Y.S.2d 95, 100 (App. Div. 1988).
95. NEw YORK REPORT, supra note 76, at 6-9.
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form, because legislators typically do not read advance sheets.9
This consideration led the Louisiana Supreme Court to include
in one opinion an instruction to the clerk of the court "to send
a copy of this opinion to each law reform body."''
At the federal level, the Governance Institute and the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit are seeking to bridge the gap between the published
opinion and needed statutory reform. They selected fifteen
cases involving technical statutory gaps to attempt to determine
how Congress examines judicial decisions identifying problems
in legislation.9s They found that Congress was not likely to
clarify the gaps raised in these cases because it was unaware
that the problems existed; specifically, in twelve of the fifteen
cases the responsible congressional committee did not know of
the court decisions.9 Their goal, therefore, is to create a low
visibility mechanism to transmit opinions or judicial sugges-
tions directly to relevant congressional committees.1c
Second, judges, legislators, and lawyers generally are not
familiar with the legislative oversight mechanisms in their
states. Perhaps this is because these mechanisms are relatively
new and their reports are not circulated widely.10 ' On the
96. Judge Mikva has noted that "[w]hile it is true . .. that a majority of
the members of Congress are lawyers, they have not kept up-to-date on recent
legal developments. In fact, most Supreme Court opinions never come to the
attention of Congress." Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend
the Constitution?, 61 N.C.L. REV. 587, 609 (1983) (citations omitted). In the
same vein, Judge Mikva has written that "[m]embers of Congress do not even
closely follow cases directly involving or interpreting statutes that they have
sponsored or in which they have an interest." Mikva, Reading and Writing
Statutes, 48 U. Prrr. L. REV. 627, 630 (1987).
97. In re J.M.P., 528 So. 2d 1002, 1017 (La. 1988). The court criticized a
private adoption statute and recommended "to each judicial and legislative re-
form body that this problem be addressed and that remedial legislation and
court rule changes be proposed as soon as possible." Id.
98. R. Katzmann, supra note 11, at 323.
99. I
100. Prepared statement of Robert A. Katzmann, President, The Govern-
ance Institute & Visiting Fellow, The Brookings Institution, to be given before
the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of
Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 6-8 (Apr. 19, 1990) (on file
with authors); R. Katzmann, supra note 11, at 322-26. Concern was expressed
at the D.C. Judicial Conference whether federal judges across the country
would cooperate in sending their opinions interpreting statutes to a central of-
fice. "Gathering the information in the first instance is perhaps one of the
most important tasks." See F. Coffin, supra note 10, at 321.
101. For example, the opinions of the Wisconsin appellate courts began
mentioning matters to the Wisconsin Law Revision Committee relatively re-
cently and then infrequently.
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other hand, the oversight committees may be relatively un-
known because legislators themselves, as well as legislative ob-
servers, do not view the committees as important in the
legislative process.
Third, determining to what extent the oversight entities
succeed in getting the legislature to act is difficult. Law revi-
sion commissions that undertake major statutory reforms gen-
erally track their success rates in the legislature. In 1989, the
California Law Revision Commission reported that the legisla-
ture accepted six of the seven bills introduced to implement
commission recommendations. 02 Other formal and informal
legislative oversight mechanisms dealing with legislative re-
sponses to isolated court decisions generally do not keep such
records.103
102. CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION COMMISSION 1989 ANNUAL REPORT 187
(1989).
103. We asked our correspondents to furnish information about their ex-
periences, specific cases or legislation, rates of success and any observations
they had concerning legislative responses to court decisions that construe stat-
utes. The mechanisms are perceived as having varying degrees of influence.
See also supra note 108 (other responses).
Connecticut
"The Attorney General's Office has been generally successful in obtaining
... clarifying amendments." Letter from Clarine Nardi Riddle, Conn. Attor-
ney General, to Hon. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Justice of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court (May 23, 1990) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Riddle Let-
ter].
Minnesota
'"There isn't much in the way of legislation coming out of the report [of
the Revisor of Statutes to the Minnesota legislature]. I think that is because
most legislators feel the courts have been correct and no change in a statute to
overcome the decision is required." Letter from Steven C. Cross, Minnesota
Revisor of Statutes, to Hon. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Justice of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court (May 4, 1990) (on file with authors).
Misissippi
"Although there is no official method to ensure appropriate action, it has
been my experience that, when necessary, legislative reaction to court deci-
sions affecting our statutes has never been wanting." Letter from T.C. Ward,
Director, Mississippi Senate Legislative Services, to Hon. Shirley S. Abraham-
son, Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court (May 1, 1990) (on file with au-
thors).
Nevada
"Our informal system seems to work very effectively. It is my opinion
that our informal system remains effective because although we are one of the
fastest growing states, Nevada remains one of the smallest with a total popula-
tion of slightly in excess of one million residents." Letter from Brian McKay,
Nevada Attorney General, to Hon. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Justice of the Wis-
consin Supreme Court (June 11, 1990) (on file with authors).
North Carolina
"It has been my experience as Revisor of Statutes that legislative propos-
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Fourth, the success of legislative oversight committees in
acting on suggestions in judicial opinions depends on the mem-
bership of the committee. Legislative oversight entities that
have key legislative leaders as members or that refer legislative
proposals to committees on which members of the oversight
committee sit probably have a better chance of getting their
legislation adopted.104
als recommended by the General Statutes Commission pursuant to court deci-
sions have been generally successful in the legislative process." Lewis Letter,
supra note 38.
Oregon
Of course, the legislature does not always adopt legislation proposed
by the Law Improvement Committee or by our office. Overall, how-
ever, I believe that both the committee and the Department of Justice
have a reasonable rate of success with law reform proposals. Court
decisions suggesting a need for statutory change certainly are not ig-
nored, and the problems with statutes highlighted by those decisions
frequently are corrected.
Letter from Donald C. Arnold, Chief Counsel, General Counsel Division, Ore-
gon Department of Justice, to Hon. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Justice of the Wis-
consin Supreme Court (May 16, 1990) (on file with authors).
Virginia
In summary, there is no centralized mechanism established to re-
view state court decisions and consider the necessity for legislative
changes as a result of those decisions.... There are no plans for any
changes in this system. The people who are most directly affected by
court decisions are able to evaluate the necessity for a legislative re-
sponse and they have the opportunity to make their recommendations
to the General Assembly. In this sense, the system is successful.
While it is for the General Assembly to determine whether or not the
proposed change should be adopted, the affected agencies at least
have the opportunity to present their concerns to the General
Assembly.
Letter from Peter R. Messitt, Virginia Ass't Attorney General, to Hon. Shirley
S. Abrahamson, Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court (May 29, 1990) (on
file with authors).
104. "The only change the [Michigan Law] Commission is likely to make in
response to that problem [of increasing the Commission's role in proposing
legislation in response to court decisions] is to get the legislative commission-
ers more actively involved with the Commission's work and to better publicize
the Commission and its work." Gulliver Letter, supra note 80. According to
the California Law Revision Commission:
The Commission has as members a Senator and an Assemblyman who
serve on the Commission because they are interested in law reform.
These legislators author the Commission bills and appear before the
committees and on the floor to explain the bills and obtain their en-
actment. This dedication to the law reform effort is equally as impor-
tant as the work that precedes it.
Memorandum from California Law Revision Commission 6 (Mar. 23, 1979)
(analysis of activities of the Law Revision Commission). The Oregon Legisla-
tive Counsel suggested that a good system for legislative oversight would be to
utilize existing legislative statutory authority to create advisory committees of
legislators and nonlegislators to undertake special projects, including statutory
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Fifth, oversight entities that have the power to draft legis-
lative proposals that can be introduced in the legislature are
more effective than those that do not. Legislative proposals in
bill form are essential if a law is to be enacted. Reports on indi-
vidual cases probably have little impact unless they are accom-
panied by specific statutory recommendations.
Sixth, legislative-judicial relations depend on the legal and
political culture of the state and on who is on the dance floor at
any given time. Personal relations and tensions between the
two branches at any given time may play as significant a role as
institutional structures.
Seventh, the institutional limitations of legislatures and the
political dynamics necessary to ensure the passage of a bill may
make adoption or modification of judicial interpretations of
statutes difficult for the legislature.1 5 A South Dakota corre-
spondent commented that the legislative results of the state's
"relatively informal" process "are mixed."
If the solution is obvious and noncontroversial, the committee gener-
ally will recommend legislation suggested by the court's opinion.
However, if the subject of the opinion is controversial, or the compet-
ing interests are politically active and well represented, the commit-
tee will let the parties directly affected by the opinion propose the
corrective legislation. If the opinion deals with a subject that for one
reason or another does not interest the Legislature, nothing will be
proposed or a recommendation will be rejected.106
A correspondent commented about the Michigan Law Re-
vision Commission's experience with legislative oversight of
court decisions as follows:
One of the problems the Commission encounters in bringing about
changes in the law to reflect new court decisions is one that is likely
the case in most jurisdictions. Often the necessary changes are not of
enough significance to produce legislative action, given the heavy leg-
islative agenda, or are of such significance that the Legislature does
revision, that legislators think necessary. '"The principal advantage of this sys-
tem is that the sequence is correct. First, a problem is defined by or for a leg-
islative group. Then an advisory committee with members having relevant
experience is appointed by legislators to study the problem and make recom-
mendations." Letter from Thomas G. Clifford, Oregon Legislative Counsel's
Office, to Hon. Dick Springer and Hon. Jan Wyers, Oregon State Senators
(Mar. 2, 1988) (on file with authors).
105. An ongoing problem with legislative oversight entities is to have mem-
bers of the entities effectively lobby the measures through the legislative ses-
sion. Clifford Letter, supra note 65.
106. Decker Letter, supr note 69. "Frequently, a decision does not gener-
ate enough interest to pass a bill through both houses of the General Assem-
bly, or the decision may affect two groups with conflicting interests." Eakin
Letter, supra note 72.
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not wait for a formal Commission recommendation. In that latter in-
stance, the resulting legislation is usually the result of so much com-
promise that the Legislature is not likely to later alter it even in the
face of a Commission recommendation. 107
Thus, whether the legislative oversight entity may effectively
rectify problems it identifies without the assistance of political
forces such as interested government agencies or political
forces outside of government remains unclear. 08
107. Gulliver Letter, supra note 80.
108. Dean Pound reported that "recommendations of the New York Com-
mission have not been taken up by the legislature as they deserve to be," indi-
cating that political dynamics may be more critical than institutional
shortcomings in preventing the adoption of corrective language to clear up
gaps or ambiguities in statutes. Dean Pound described private lobbying groups
as "the most numerous, continuously acting and continuously effective" influ-
ence on legislation. Pound, Ministry, supra note 7, at 640. Comments from
other states include:
Colorado
"Primary legislative impetus to correct court opinions com[es] from com-
peting private forces." Letter from Richard H. Forman, Solicitor General, Col-
orado Dept. of Law, to Hon. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Justice of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court (May 14, 1990) (on file with authors).
Connecticut
Except for the Connecticut Law Revision Commission annual report,
the review of court decisions and their relevance to state statutes is
fairly informal.... The present informal system seems to work. The
affected group, be it a state agency, the plaintiff's or defendant's bar,
or legal services, can articulate the need for any statutory amendment
before the General Assembly.
Riddle Letter, supra note 103.
Ohio
There clearly has been, in many instances, a direct cause-and-effect
relationship between decisions of the Supreme Court of Ohio and
amendments by the Ohio General Assembly to statutory provi-
sions.... [Tlhe need for amendment is usually brought to the atten-
tion of the Ohio General Assembly through one of two channels. The
first of these channels is through the various bar associations in
Ohio.... As I would anticipate is also the case in most other states,
another common mechanism through which requests for legislative
change are presented is through those persons or groups whose partic-
ular interests have been affected by the judicial decision.
Letter from Shawn H. Nau, Ohio Ass't Attorney General, to Hon. Shirley S.
Abrahamson, Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court (May 15, 1990) (on file
with authors).
Oklahoma
"Unfortunately, neither of these monitoring activities [of the House and
Senate legal staffs] usually results in the adoption of legislation unless the
statute in question is of substantial or general public concern." Miles-
LaGrange Letter, supra note 72.
Pennsylvania
'The informal mechanism for oversight is part of the legislative process.
Decisions of state or federal courts may give tremendous impetus to passage of
a law, but it is usually through observations by a staff counsel, or an affected
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Our final observation is that a rich array of data exists in
the states, ready for study, to determine the feasibility and ef-
fectiveness of legislative oversight and to understand and evalu-
ate the role in the legislative process of judicial decisions
interpreting statutes. If the states want to improve their own
legislative products, they can begin by undertaking studies
based on the existing data.
III. THE ROLE OF JUDGES IN THE LEGISLATIVE
PROCESS
We began by asking whether judicial decisions that inter-
pret statutes influence legislative policy. We then explored in-
stitutions that monitor court decisions for the legislature. We
now return to the judge and explore the role, if any, of a judge
in influencing legislative policy outside the channel of judicial
decisionmaking. In other words, should judges attempt to in-
fluence legislative policy by techniques other than writing judi-
cial decisions?
As our survey of second-look mechanisms suggests, the ju-
diciary has several formal, public means of communicating with
the legislature. In addition to the reports described earlier, in
many states the chief justice delivers a state of the judiciary ad-
dress 09 or testifies before the legislature about the court
budget-' 0 In several states the supreme court gives advisory
opinions to the legislature."' Judges serve on law reform com-
missions, bar association and other committees, or task forces
studying and proposing reforms in the law." 2 Judges thus par-
agency or constituency that legislation will result." Letter from Ernest D.
Preate, Jr., Pennsylvania Attorney General, to Hon. Shirley S. Abrahamson,
Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court (May 22, 1990) (on file with authors).
109. In about five states, the constitution or statutes require the chief jus-
tice to deliver a state of the judiciary address to the legislature; in about 25
states, the address is delivered to the legislature by invitation. National
Center for State Courts, Conference Materials, Legislative and Judicial Rela-
tions: Seeking a New Partnership, table 5 (Oct. 1-3, 1989) (Denver Confer-
ence) [hereinafter Conference Materials]; see Moyer, State of the Ohio
Judiciary, 51 Omo ST. L.J. 269 (1990) (transcript of Chief Justice's address to
the general assembly).
110. Memorandum, National Center for State Courts, Ref. No. RIS 86.013:
Appearance of Chief Justice before the Legislature Regarding the Budget
(Mar. 1986).
111. In about 12 states, the court gives the legislature advisory opinions on
the constitutionality of proposed legislation. Conference Materials, supra note
109.
112. Several judges, for example, are members of the Louisiana Law Insti-
tute. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24:202 (1990). In Connecticut, a Supreme Court
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ticipate in the formulation of proposed legislative policy
through these institutional mechanisms and yet refrain from
direct contact with legislators in their legislative role - contact
that might be viewed as political.
The question we address here concerns the individual and
personal participation of judges in formulating and advocating
enactment of substantive legislation, rather than participation
through such intermediaries as a bar association or a court ad-
ministrator approaching the legislature.1' 3 We are concerned
Justice served on the Law Revision Commission but did not participate in the
preparation of the Commission's Report reviewing judicial decisions. CON-
NECTICUT LAW REvIsION COMMISSION NINTH ANNUAL REPORT 5 (1983). Judges
Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Henry J. Friendly have suggested that a retired
judge serve on the "second look Congressional Committee." A retired judge
knows the problems of the judiciary but would not have to be concerned about
sitting on cases involving statutes the judge has endorsed during enactment.
Ginsburg, supra note 10, at 1016-17; Friendly, supra note 8, at 805. For a dis-
cussion of federal judges serving on executive or legislative commissions that
report their findings, see L. FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES 157-59
(1988). For discussions of the potential conflict between the requirements of
judicial impartiality and judges participating in the American Bar Association,
which files amicus briefs and takes policy positions, see REPORT OF THE COM-
MISSION ON JUDICIAL PARTICIPATION IN THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (Feb.
1991); the Indiana Commission on Judicial Qualifications issued Advisory
Opinion No. 9-90 that "an Indiana judge may belong to the American Bar As-
sociation so long as the judge refrains from any participation in the Associa-
tion's involvement in social, legal and political issues." 34 RES GESTAE 457
(Apr. 1991). For advisory opinions on judges' participation in bar associations,
civic organizations and government boards and on judges' legislative and pub-
lic activities, see Civic Activities and Political Speech in D. SOLOMON, THE DI-
GEST OF JUDICIAL ETHICS ADVISORY OPINIONS (1991). Canons 4(C)(2) & (3) of
the Model Code of Judicial Conduct provides:
(2) A judge shall not accept appointment to a governmental commit-
tee or commission or other governmental position that is concerned
with issues of fact or policy on matters other than the improvement of
the law, the legal system or the administration of justice ....
(3) A judge may serve as an officer, director, trustee or non-legal ad-
visor of an organization or governmental agency devoted to the im-
provement of the law, the legal system or the administration of
justice.., subject to the following limitations and the other require-
ments of this Code.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canons 4(C)(2) & (3) (1990) [hereinafter
MODEL JUDICIAL CODE].
For a chart showing state legislative-judicial mechanisms, see National
Center for State Courts, Pre-Conference Survey Results, Legislative-Judicial
Relations: Seeking a New Partnership, 35-36 (Oct. 1-3, 1989) (Denver
Conference).
113. In many states the Administrative Office of the Supreme Court works
closely with the legislature. The court administrator provides data to support
legislative requests and testifies before committees. Many state court adminis-
trators supply judicial impact statements for the legislature. See Memoran-
dum, National Center for State Courts, Ref. No. RIS 84.072: States that
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with substantive public policy issues, not issues relating pecu-
liarly to judicial administration,li 4 such as the budget of the ju-
Prepare Impact Statements to Accompany Proposed Legislation that Affects
Courts (Aug. 1984). Administrators may also be involved in initiating legisla-
tion and negotiating changes in proposed legislation. See Memorandum, Na-
tional Center for State Courts, Ref. No. RIS 84.115: The Role of the
Administrative Office of the Courts in the Review and Initiation of Legislation
(Jan. 1985).
The Administrative Offices of the California, New York, and Washington
courts have a Legislative Office. In 1988 the Legislative Office of the Califor-
nia Courts
reviewed approximately 3,400 bills and measures and determined that
about 700 of these were court-related. Court-related measures are
closely followed through each step of the legislative process. About
260 of these court-related measures were enacted and signed by the
Governor. The Legislative Office also completed its seventh annual
court cost and revenue estimates for California trial courts, which are
used to estimate the fiscal impact of court-related legislation.
2 CALORNIA JUDiCiAL COUNCIL 1989 ANNUAL REPORT (1989). Other state
courts have distinct legislative divisions or have personnel who review bills af-
fecting judicial administration and respond to the legislature. As of 1985,
Pennsylvania employed a full-time deputy court administrator as a legislative
liaison. See M. Hendrickson, Lobbying by State Supreme Court Justices, Pa-
per presented at the 1985 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science As-
soc., 47 (Apr. 17-20, 1985).
The Administrator of the Mississippi Supreme Court wrote: "Formal
communication usually occurs between my office and the legislative entity in-
volved, although our judicial canons allow an individual judge or justice to
'consult with an executive or legislative body or official ... on matters con-
cerning the administration of justice.' Canon 4(B), Code of Jud. Conduct."
Whitten Letter, supra note 83. The Administrative Office of West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals prepares reports to the Legislature outlining legis-
lation that is necessary to comply with Court opinions. The judiciary develops
a legislative agenda that is presented to the Legislature as a judicial program
in the Chief Justice's State of the Judiciary Address. "This has proven to be a
very effective process, and I would recommend it to other courts." Letter
from Ted Philyaw, Admin. Dir. of the Courts, West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals, to Hon. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court (June 21, 1990) (on file with authors).
The Judicial Conference of the state or the federal system may initiate,
endorse, or promote legislation. See Linde, Observations of a State Court
Judge, in JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS, supra note 4, at 124-25; Katzmann, The
Continuing Challenge, in JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS, supra note 4, at 181; L.
FISHER, supra note 112, at 156-57.
114. Former Justice Linde distinguishes between (1) legislation important
to the institutional functioning of the court system; (2) legislation important to
judges as a class of public servants; and (3) legislation involving matters of sub-
stantive or general public policy. Linde, Observations of a State Court Judge,
in JUDGE AND LEGISLATORS, supra note 4, at 121. Although the line between
the judicial administration (institutional functioning) and substantive or gen-
eral public policy is blurred at times, we nevertheless draw the line for pur-
poses of this Essay, recognizing that in some questions of judicial
administration, judges may be a special interest group. Questions that arise in
the area of judicial administration concerning legislative-judicial relations and
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dicial system,1 1 5 judicial salaries and pensions, the creation of
new courts or judgeships, and similar issues we label judicial
administration.116
Substantive public policy legislation affects the judicial ma-
chinery and operation of the courts. Judges have come to be-
lieve that they could help the judicial system and the public if
they had input before the statute was adopted.
judges' attempts to affect legislative policy may differ from questions in other
public policy areas.
115. Justices lobby because the legislature controls the purse strings and
passes legislation which deals directly with or affects the courts. West Virginia
Supreme Court Chief Justice Neely wrote that he lobbies the legislature vigor-
ously to secure resources for the court. He described his legislative activities
as follows:
I spend an inordinate amount of my time with the legislature. I write
to every legislator four times a year and maintain constant personal
communication when the legislature is at the capitol. I entertain leg-
islators at my house and spend evenings in suite 1105 of the Daniel
Boone Hotel, where there is a legislative 'hospitality room' in progress
all winter (and I do not even drink). Inevitably, courts do things
which are offensive to the legislature, so judges must make up in per-
sonal rapport what they lose on the merits of issues....
At" the judges' conventions, my observations on practical legisla-
tive relations are received with the same enthusiasm that the bastard
son is received at the reading of the will. Whenever I admit that a
substantial portion of my January, February, and March is spent
smoking and joking [with] the legislature, other judges stick up their
noses because I insufficiently appreciate the pristine Olympian func-
tion of the judiciary. Nevertheless, I usually get my clerks, typewrit-
ers, and process servers without being too much of a whore in the
bargain. (Anyway, I have four virgin colleagues.)
R. NEELY, How CoURTS GOVERN AMERICA 146-47 (1981); see also Yarwood &
Canon, On the Supreme Court's Annual Trek to the Capitol, 63 JUDIcATuRE
322 (1980) (anecdotes about the Justices' visits to the congressional appropria-
tions committee to appeal for the Court's budget); L. FISHER, supra note 112,
at 160-61 (Federal Judges Association lobbying for judicial salaries). A Low-
Budget High Court, N.Y. Times, Mar. 1, 1991, at B9, col. 4 (Justices O'Connor
and Scalia seek Senate approval of the Court's $25 million budget request).
116. For a discussion of Congress's use of the budget powers to signal ap-
proval or disapproval of United States Supreme Court decisions and the rela-
tionship between congressional budget allocations and Supreme Court
decisionmaking, see Toma, Congressional Influence and the Supreme Court:
The Budget as a Signaling Device, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 131 (1991). For discus-
sions of state courts' inherent power to finance the judicial system and inde-
pendence of the judiciary, see, e.g., Baar, Judicial Activism in State Courts:
The Inherent-Powers Doctrine, in M. PORTER & G. TARR, STATE SUPREME
COURTS: POLICYMAKERS IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 84 (1982); Stern, The Judici-
ary Is Failing to Protect the Courts, 18 JUDGES' J. 16 (Winter 1979); Robertson
& Brown, The Judiciary's Inherent Power to Compel Funding: A Tale of Heat-
ing Stoves and Air Conditioners, 20 ST. MARY'S L.J. 863 (1989); Brennan, Judi-
cial Fiscal Independence, 23 U. FLA. L. REV. 277 (1971); Hazard, McNamara &
Sentilles, Court Finance and Unitary Budgeting, 81 YALE L.J. 1286 (1972).
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No clear models of the appropriate role of a judge's partici-
pation in the legislative process emerge from the scant pub-
lished materials or from our own inquiries of jurists around the
country. Little empirical information is available about how
and to what extent state judges seek to influence legislative
policy. In a 1985 study of lobbying by supreme court justices in
Arizona, Minnesota, Mississippi, and Pennsylvania, Mary Hen-
drickson reported that differences exist from state to state in
the forms, scope, and amount of lobbying." 7 According to the
study, factors that may determine judicial lobbying activities in-
clude the methods by which the states select supreme court jus-
tices, the amount of rulemaking authority of the highest state
court, the workload of the justices, the regional representation
of the justices, and the degree of tension between the legisla-
ture and the judiciary. Hendrickson observed that when rela-
tions are strained justices may attempt to make up for the
tension by increasing communications with legislators and that
strained relations encourage informal rather than formal chan-
nels of communication. Hendrickson concluded that "judges
are closely attuned to legislative actions affecting courts and
carefully implement their lobbying efforts to fit their political
environment." 11
In 1970 Henry Glick conducted a mail survey of state chief
justices, legislative leaders, and presidents of state bar associa-
tions to investigate court involvement in state policy-making.
He found that the most frequently used technique to make pol-
icy proposals outside the opinions was the personal conference
between judges and legislators. Glick concluded that informal
interactions have low visibility and no legal traditions or philos-
ophies to legitimize them." 9
Anxiety among legislators and judges about communica-
117. M. Hendrickson, supra note 113. We speak of judges generally here.
There may be, however, different considerations for lobbying by trial judges
and judges of the state's highest court.
118. I&
119. Glick, Policy-Making and State Supreme Courts: The Judiciary as an
Interest Group, 5 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 271, 274 (1970). Glick concluded that fed-
eral judges have used five strategies to influence legislative action: presenting
views in a judicial decision; interpreting statutes restrictively with the inten-
tion of forcing congressional action; presenting policy preferences in dicta; us-
ing informal personal contacts for the exchange of views; and lobbying in a
systematic and well-organized fashion to influence the votes of legislators on
bills important to the court. I& (citing W. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL
STRATEGY 123-55 (1964)). For discussions of lobbying efforts by federal judges,
see, eg., Winkle, Judges as Lobbyists: Habeas Corpus Reform in the 1940's, 68
JUDICATURE 263, 273 (1985); Judges Spar at Hearing Over Powell Report,
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tions stems from uncertainty about the ethical, legal, and
prudential boundaries. At a recent conference entitled "Legis-
lative-Judicial Relations: Seeking a New Partnership," partici-
pants identified six obstacles to communications between the
courts and the legislature: (1) ingrained negative attitudes to-
ward each other's branches; (2) limited knowledge of each
other's institutional roles and procedures; (3) lack of a desig-
nated judicial spokesperson; (4) conflict created by institutional
checks and balances; (5) judicial caution in approaching the leg-
islature; and (6) lack of clear guidelines for judicial
participation. °20
Two of these obstacles - ingrained negative attitudes and
limited knowledge of each other's institutional roles and proce-
dures - might be rectified by educating members of the two
branches of government.
Other impediments identified by conference participants,
however, such as the conflict between the two branches created
by institutional checks and balances and the absence of clear
guidelines for judicial participation, suggest a need for judges,
legislators, and the public at large to reflect on the ramifica-
tions of direct judicial participation in the legislative process.
The positive and negative aspects of, and limitations on, judicial
participation in substantive statutory reform should be an inte-
gral part of the dialogue between the two branches.
As they consider legislation, many legislators might wel-
come the advice and counsel of judges and regard the judges'
experience as a helpful resource. Former United States Repre-
sentative from Wisconsin Robert Kastenmeier has said that the
testimony of judges who appear before Congress in their per-
sonal capacities is well received and is considered to improve
the quality of the hearing process.121 Other legislators may be
wary about judicial participation in the legislative process and
may express resentment toward judges' incursion into the legis-
lative domain.122
NAT'L L.J., Nov. 20, 1989, at 5 [hereinafter Powell Report]; L. FISHER, supra
note 112, at 153-61.
120. Ridge & Friesen, Legislative-Judicial Relations: Seeking a New Part-
nership, 14 ST. CT. J. 19, 20 (1990).
121. Kastenmeier & Remington, A Judicious Legislator's Lexicon to the
Federal Judiciary, in JUDGEs AND LEGISLATORS, supra note 4, at 54, 85.
122. After a member of the Wisconsin Revisor of Statutes Office com-
mented at a Law Revision Committee Meeting that courts were occasionally
referring to S. 13.92 (2)(b), which is the Revisor's directive to prepare the list
of cases and opinions for the Law Revision Committee, Wisconsin State Sena-
tor Stitt commented that "although it does not yet appear to be a problem, he
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A similar divergence of opinion exists among judges. For
many judges and many members of the public at large, judicial
participation in proposing legislative solutions and in comment-
ing on substantive policy issues before the legislature seems an
appropriate application of expertise acquired on the bench.
Through their work resolving disputes, judges identify deficien-
cies in particular statutes and may recognize broader public pol-
icy problems that a statute seeks to address or regulate that
stretch beyond the parameters of a particular case.
Moreover, judges may be in a good position to influence the
legislature because of their institutional position and personal
access to the legislators. Former Oregon Supreme Court Jus-
tice Hans Linde concludes:
There are no insurmountable legal obstacles to useful interaction be-
tween judges and legislators in the development of good policies with
respect to the judicial institution or to substantive law. What is im-
portant is to maintain clear distinctions as to whether a judge speaks
for the institutional concerns of the judicial branch, for the personal
interests of judges as a group, or as an individual citizen expressing
his or her own policy views.=s
Other judges are wary of a legislative role for the judici-
ary.124 Part of this hesitation is based on judges' view of their
constitutional role. Some judges view separation of powers as
constituting a barrier to judicial participation in influencing leg-
islation. They see individual judges involved in legislative activ-
ities as walking violations of the separation of powers
doctrine. 25
is concerned that the courts, particularly in dissents, may attempt to drive the
legislative process." LAw REvIsiON COMMITrEE, Wis. LEGIs. CoUNcIL, SUM-
MARY OF PROCEEDINGS 7 (Mar. 24, 1987).
123. Linde, supra note 113, at 128. For expressions of divergent views of
the propriety of judges participating in substantive legislation, see Katzmann,
Summary of Proceedings, in JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS, supra note 4, at 162-
66, 169-70. See supra note 112.
124. Some judges, for example, express discomfort at even sending their
opinions directly to Congress. "It seems to me... that goes beyond the prov-
ince of the Article M function." Judge Starr would prefer for judges to send
their opinions to an administrative apparatus of the judicial branch which
could then send opinions on to Congress. K. Starr, supra note 32, at 333-34.
125. Former Justice Linde concludes that "'separation of power' is only a
label for a sense of the fitness of things, not a legal obstacle to communication
between judges and lawmakers." Linde, supra note 113, at 123. Former Dean
of Harvard Law School Erwin Griswold concluded that congressional action
required direct contact with a legislator and that there are "real barriers" to
direct communication between judges and legislators. He would have in-
termediaries make the contacts. E. Griswold, Remarks at the Proceedings of
the Forty-ninth Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit, re-
printed in 124 F.R.D. 241, 334-35 (1989). For successful communication from
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Part of the judicial hesitation may also be political; contro-
versial decisions and disputes about the two branches' respec-
tive turfs engender institutional tension between the bench and
the legislature. This tension may make judges wary of ap-
proaching the legislature. 26
Moreover, many judges are concerned that judicial partici-
pation in the legislative process, with its potential appearance
of involvement in partisan politics, could tarnish the legitimacy
of an independent judiciary. The public expects the courts to
work above the tangle of partisan politics. Codes of judicial
ethics often prohibit a judge from engaging in political activi-
ties.127 Furthermore, if judges take positions on issues or sug-
gest or draft statutory language, they may appear to have
prejudged a later case raising similar issues or involving the
very statute and have to disqualify themselves. 28 Remaining
judges to legislators through opinions and letters, see Kastenmeier & Reming-
ton, supra note 121, at 83. For discussions of the propriety of judges' legisla-
tive and extrajudicial activities, see, e.g., D'Alemberte, Searching for the
Limits of Judicial Free Speech, 61 TUL. L. REV. 611 (1987); Lubet, Judicial
Ethics and Private Lives, 79 Nw. U.L. REv. 983 (1985); McKay, The Judiciary
and Nonjudicial Activities, 9 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9 (1970); McKay,
Judges, The Code of Judicial Conduct and Nonjudicial Activities, 1972 UTAH
L. REV. 391; Nathanson, The Extra-Judicial Activities of Supreme Court Jus-
tices: Where Should the Line Be Drawn (Book Review), 78 Nw. U.L. REv. 494
(1983); Westin, Out-of-Court Commentary by United States Supreme Court
Justices, 1790-1962: Of Free Speech and Judicial Lockjaw, 62 COLUM. L. REv.
633 (1962); Nonjudicial Activities of Supreme Court Justices and Other Fed-
eral Judges, Hearings on S. 1097 & S. 2109 Before the Subcomm. on Separation
of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
For a discussion of the Framers' debate of the role of federal judicial involve-
ment in the creation of laws, see Barry, The Council of Revision and the Lim-
its of Judicial Power, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 261 (1989). See supra notes 112,
123. We do not address the issue of judges' complying with statutes regulating
lobbying activities.
126. The Chicago Tribune reported tension between the Illinois Supreme
Court and the General Assembly growing from the court's refusal to allow the
legislature to audit two agencies under the court's control regulating the attor-
neys. The newspaper reported that the court has quietly approached legisla-
tive leaders to attempt to quell growing legislative criticism of the court. Chi.
Tribune, May 4, 1990, § H, at 1, col. 1. For discussions of sources of conflict
between the legislature and court tending to influence the communication be-
tween the courts and the legislature, see M. Hendrickson, supra note 113, at
38-39, 42-43.
127. MODEL JUDICIAL CODE, supra note 112, Canon 5. Canon 5 is entitled-
"a judge or judicial candidate shall refrain from inappropriate political
activity."
128. At least one judge has concluded that his past political career as a leg-
islator prevented him from participating in a pending case. As a legislator,
State Senator William Bablitch was instrumental in drafting provisions of Wis-
consin's campaign financing legislation. As a member of the Wisconsin
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out of the political fray and out of controversial disputes about
substantive law may serve to enhance the judiciary's indepen-
dence, legitimacy, and impartiality. Finally, extrajudicial legis-
lative activity might draw already busy judges away from their
primary responsibility to hear and decide cases.
Questions about judges' lobbying are many; the answers are
few. While the American Bar Association Code of Judicial
Conduct views judges as being in a unique position to contrib-
Supreme Court, Justice Bablitch recused himself from a case evaluating the
constitutionality of some of the financing law's key provisions when one of the
parties made a motion for his disqualification. Justice Bablitch wrote:
I fear that the extensive advocacy use of my 1974 memorandum...
has created the appearance that I could presently be an advocate of
their position. At the very least, an impression has been created that
I cannot review the issue impartially. I cannot continue to sit on the
case under such circumstances.
Letter from Hon. W. Bablitch, Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, to
various interested parties (May 23, 1990) (on file with authors and in Gard v.
Wis. State Elections Board, Wis. Supreme Court Case No. 90-0298-OA). For
discussions of disqualification on the basis of judges' prior legislative experi-
ence, see United States v. Alabama, 828 F.2d 1532, 1538-46 (11th Cir. 1987) (per
curiam), cert denied sub nora. Board of Trustees v. Auburn University, 487
U.S. 1210 (1988); Leaman v. Ohio Dep't of Mental Retardation & Developmen-
tal Disabilities, 825 F.2d 946, 949-50 (6th Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert denied, 487
U.S. 1204 (1988); Limeco, Inc. v. Division of Lime, 571 F. Supp. 710 (N.D. Miss.
1983); In re Thomas W. Sullivan, 283 Ala. 514, 523, 219 So. 2d 346, 353, cert
denied, 393 U.S. 826 (1969); Department of Revenue v. Golder, 322 So. 2d 1, 3-5
(Fla. 1975); Norton v. Lyon Van & Storage Co., 9 Cal. App. 2d 199, 204, 49 P.2d
311, 313 (1935), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 662 (1936); Newburyport Redevelopment
Auth. v. Commonwealth, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 206, 245, 401 N.E.2d 118, 144 (1980).
Discussions of recusal or disqualification have most frequently arisen not in
the context of prior legislative service, but when a judge has previously ex-
pressed an opinion on issues involved in pending litigation. See, e.g., J. SHA-
MAN, S. LUBET & J. ALFINi, JUDICIAL CoNDuCr AND ETHICS § 12.10 at 377-79
(1990); Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824 (1972) (memorandum) (then Justice Rehn-
quist declined to recuse himself even though, as Justice Department attorney,
he had given congressional testimony supporting the constitutionality of the
very program at issue in the case). For discussions of judicial disqualification,
see J. SHAMAN, S. LUBET, & J. ALFINI, supra, ch. 5 (1990); Bloom, Judicial
Bias and Financial Interest as Grounds for Disqualification of Federal
Judges, 35 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 662 (1985); Burbank, Procedural Rulemaking
under the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act
of 1980, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 283 (1982); Fall, Liljeberg v. Health Services Acqui-
sition Corp.: The Supreme Court Encourages Disqualification of Federal
Judges under Section 455(a), 1989 Wis. L. REV. 1033; Frank, Disqualification
of Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 605 (1947); Frank, Commentary on Disqualifcation of
Judges - Canon 3C, 1972 UTAH L. REV. 377; Hjelmfelt, Statutory Disqualifica-
tion of Federal Judges, 30 U. KAN. L. REV. 255, 262-63 (1982); Kilgarin &
Bruch, Disqualification and Recusal of Judges, 17 ST. MARY'S L.J. 723 (1981);
Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging and Judge Disqualification, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV.
237 (1987); Lewis, Systematic Due Process: Procedural Concepts and the Prob-
lem of Recusal, 38 U. KAN. L. REV. 381 (1990).
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ute to the improvement of the law, the legal system and the ad-
ministration of justice,129 the Code does not provide clear-cut
easy-to-apply rules governing judges' involvement or participa-
tion in the legislative process.
The 1972 American Bar Association Code of Judicial Con-
duct, which nearly all the states have adopted in some form, en-
courages judges to speak, write, lecture, teach, and participate
in other activities concerning the law, the legal system, and the
administration of justice so long as this activity "does not cast
doubt on his [or her] capacity to decide impartially any issue
that may come before him [or her]."'130 Canon 7 of the Code ex-
pressly permits a judge to engage in political activity on behalf
of measures to improve the law, the legal system, and the ad-
ministration of justice.131 According to the reporter for the
ABA drafting committee, this provision was designed "to per-
mit a judge to engage in projects directed at the drafting of leg-
islation."'132 The Canons expressly permit a judge to appear at
a public hearing before a legislative body on these three topics,
but if the judge wants to meet privately with legislators, the
discussion is limited to "matters concerning the administration
of justice.' 133 Apparently, private consultation on issues of the
129. MODEL JUDICIAL CODE, supra note 112, Canon 4(B) and commentary;,
see supra notes 121-23 and infra notes 130-34 and accompanying text.
130. Canon 4(A) of the Model Judicial Code (1972) provides:
A judge, subject to the proper performance of his judicial duties,
may engage in the following quasi-judicial activities, if in doing so he
does not cast doubt on his capacity to decide impartially any issue that
may come before him:
A. He may speak, write, lecture, teach, and participate in other
activities concerning the law, the legal system, and the administration
of justice.
MODEL JUDICIAL CODE, supra note 112, Canon 4(A); see infra note 133.
131. .Canon 7(A)(4) of the Model Judicial Code (1972) provides: "A judge
should not engage in any other political activity except on behalf of measures
to improve the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice." MODEL
JUDICIAL CODE, supra note 112, Canon 7(A)(4).
132. E. W. THODE, REPORTER'S NoTEs TO THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDuar
76 (1973).
133. Canon 4(B) of the Model Judicial Code (1972) provides:
A judge, subject to the proper performance of his judicial duties,
may engage in the following quasi-judicial activities, if in doing so he
does not cast doubt on his capacity to decide impartially any issue that
may come before him:
B. He may appear at a public hearing before an executive or leg-
islative body or official on matters concerning the law, the legal sys-
tem, and the administration of justice, and he may otherwise consult
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law and the legal system is impermissible.1 34
A primary reason for limiting subjects on which judges
may confer privately with legislators is that matters relating to
judicial administration are less likely to result in litigation than
other issues. The ABA drafting committee reasoned that
judges' views on matters that might later be litigated should be
expressed publicly so that litigants may be apprised of the
judges' views and activities.'15
The recently adopted (August 1990) ABA Model Code of
Judicial Conduct apparently does away with the distinction be-
tween public and private communications between judges and
legislators and now prohibits any consultation between judges
and legislators except on matters concerning the law, the legal
system, or the administration of justice.136
Some states have moved to restrict judges' participation in
the legislative process to limited situations. For example, the
New Jersey Supreme Court's 1987 Guidelines for Extrajudicial
Activities allow judges to appear upon invitation before a legis-
with an executive or legislative body or official, but only on matters
concerning the administration of justice.
... Commentary: As a judicial officer and person specially
learned in the law, a judge is in a unique position to contribute to the
improvement of the law, the legal system, and the administration of
justice, including revision of substantive and procedural law and im-
provement of criminal and juvenile justice. To the extent that his
time permits, he is encouraged to do so, either independently or
through a bar association, judicial conference, or other organization
dedicated to the improvement of the law.
Extra-judicial activities are governed by Canon 5.
MODEL JUDICIAL CODE, supra note 112, Canon 4(B). The National Law Jour-
nal reported the Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on the Powell Commit-
tee Report on federal habeas corpus review of capital cases stating "Chief
Judges of the federal circuits don't often appear as Senate witnesses and, even
rarer, appear and stand divided." Powell Report supra note 119, at 5.
134. But see inifa text accompanying note 136.
135. E. W. THODE, supra note 132, at 76.
136. Canons 4(C)(1) and (3) of the Model Judicial Code (1990) provides:
C. Governmental, Civic or Charitable Activities.
(1) A judge shall not appear at a public hearing before, or other-
wise consult with, an executive or legislative body or official except
on matters concerning the law, the legal system or the administration
of justice or except when acting pro se in a matter involving the judge
or the judge's interests.
(3) A judge may serve as an officer, director, trustee or non-legal
advisor of an organization or governmental agency devoted to the im-
provement of the law, the legal system or the administration of jus-
tice or of an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal or civic
organization not conducted for profit.
MODEL JUDICIAL CODE, supra note 112, Canons 4(C)(1) & (3).
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lative body to discuss matters concerning the law, legal system,
and administration of justice when the judge has the permis-
sion of the Supreme Court, the hearing is public, the subject
matter reasonably may be considered to merit the attention and
comment of a judge as a judge and not merely as an individual,
and the appearance will not involve the office in political
controversy.1 3 7
The generally accepted view is that judges should be con-
cerned with legislative programs directly affecting themselves
as judges and the operation of the judicial branch of govern-
ment. No consensus exists regarding judges' role in the broader
legislative process of substantive policy making. Lobbying ac-
tivities acceptable in one state might not be acceptable in an-
other. Different protocols may be necessary for different kinds
of communications, depending on such factors as the nature of
the issue; whether the communication is by individual judges,
by the judicial conference, by the supreme court, or by the ad-
ministrative office of the court; whether the court or legislature
initiates the communication; and whether the communication is
formal, open, and public or informal and closed.138 Discussions
of the role of the courts and individual judges in influencing
legislative decisions must be free and open, leading to develop-
ment of guidelines for interpersonal communication.1 3 9
CONCLUSION
Simply put, the legislature's responsibility in the United
States' system of government is to enact statutes. The court's
responsibility is to interpret and apply the statutes to resolve
disputes. Courts have recognized another responsibility, how-
ever, that of using their decisions to point out statutory defi-
ciencies so that statutes may be more intelligible and cohesive,
137. NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT GUIDEN FOR ExTRAJUDICIAL AC'rVI-
Ts 6 (1987). Justice Linde reports that the Judicial Conference in Oregon
maintains that the judicial branch will not involve itself in substantive law leg-
islation but permits individual judges to transmit their ideas to the legislature
or take positions dissenting from those of the Judicial Conference. Linde,
supra note 113, at 125.
138. One recommendation of the Denver Conference on Legislative-Judi-
cial Relations was "to explore and develop guidelines for interbranch commu-
nication, in an attempt to remedy the communications gap between
legislatures and courts." National Center for State Courts, Final Conference
Report and Agenda for Future Action, Legislative-Judicial Relations: Seeking
a New Partnership 5 (Oct. 1-3, 1990) (Denver Conference).
139. Conference Summary, supra note 6, at 16.
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as well as more responsive to the conditions the legislature
sought to address.
When the legislature does not respond to a written opinion,
should judges increase their off-the-bench influence over the
legislative process? As we have suggested, the role judges
should play beyond their decisions and beyond the courtroom
presents significant concerns. Will the active involvement of
judges in legislative forums affect the judges' ability to resolve
disputes from the bench?
A recurring theme sounded in judicial and legislative cir-
cles is the need to increase the level of dialogue between legis-
lators and judges. In a world in which the judicial and
legislative branches tend to go their separate ways, each having
to live with the sometimes burdensome consequences of the
other's action, cooperation and dialogue are always intoxicating
music to the ear. Judges need to know how the legislature op-
erates and how to evaluate legislative history for purposes of
statutory interpretation, cooperation and dialogue are always
intoxicating music to the ears. Judges need to know how to at-
tract the attention of legislative revision committees in their
written opinions. Conversely, legislators need to understand
the conventions and canons of the judiciary and pay more at-
tention to "low-profile" cases that point out a need for statutory
reform. Given that judges and legislators share an interest in
improving the laws and the administration of justice, should
they work more closely together on this common enterprise? If
so, how? We return to the question originally posed.
"Shall we dance?"
Without a hint of coquettishness, the answer today must be
a resounding perhaps.
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